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FCPA SANCTIONS:  TOO BIG TO DEBAR? 
Drury D. Stevenson*  & Nicholas J. Wagoner**
 
 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) criminalizes bribery of 
foreign government officials.  The frequency of enforcement actions and 
severity of fines levied against corporations under the FCPA have 
significantly increased in the last few years.  There is an ongoing problem, 
however, with the sanctions for FCPA violations:  enforcement authorities 
(the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission) 
and contracting officials have limited themselves to fines, civil penalties, 
and occasional imprisonment of individual violators.  Debarment from 
future federal government contracts, even temporarily, is an unused 
sanction for FCPA violations, even though Congress provided for this 
punishment by statute.  Debarment offers a far more potent deterrent than 
fines and penalties, as multinational contractors that conduct business with 
the United States are much less likely to view the sanction as merely a cost 
of doing business.  If ridding foreign markets of corruption truly is a top 
priority of the United States, it seems both unfair and imprudent for federal 
agencies to continue awarding lucrative, multi-billion dollar contracts to 
firms recently prosecuted for fraudulently obtaining them overseas. 
Enforcement officials shy away from debarring entities that violate the 
FCPA due to the short-term inconvenience of an agency’s inability to 
transact business with its favorite contractor, its inability to demand 
favorable bids from contractors when the field of potential bidders has 
thinned, the resulting job loss, and the risk of overdeterring companies that 
might otherwise pursue lucrative opportunities in emerging markets.  This 
is the “too big to debar” problem—the federal government is too dependent 
on a particular set of large, private sector corporations for equipment and 
services.  In addition to the virtual immunity from debarment enjoyed by 
these firms when they violate the FCPA, the fines imposed for engaging in 
foreign corrupt practices comprise a tiny fraction of the potential revenue 
generated by lucrative contracts with the United States and foreign states.  
When discounted by the low probability of detection, these sanctions are far 
too low to deter unlawful activity. 
 
*  Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law (Houston, TX).  The authors would like to 
thank Professor Mike Koehler for lending his thoughtful feedback and expertise. 
**  Nicholas Wagoner will join Roger, Morris & Grover’s public law practice in November 
2011. 
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Debarment would deter potential wrongdoers and incapacitate actual 
offenders.  The deterrent would induce more firms to comply with the law, 
which would allow the “too big to debar” problem to diminish over time.  
To help illuminate these concerns and lend support to the thesis, this Article 
will examine the third largest FCPA-related enforcement action to date:  
the BAE Systems case.  On March 1, 2010, BAE Systems paid 
approximately $400 million in fines for its corrupt practices abroad.  In the 
year that followed, however, the federal government awarded BAE 
contracts in excess of $6 billion.  The United States’ refusal to debar BAE 
because of the potential “collateral consequences” provides a case study 
on the benefits and drawbacks of deterring foreign corruption through 
suspension and debarment.  This Article concludes that the United States 
must begin to diversify its portfolio of federal contractors so that 
prosecutors may leverage the legitimate threat of suspension and 
debarment to more effectively deter foreign corruption. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 777 
I.  BACKGROUND ....................................................................................... 780 
A.  The Dark Side of Foreign Corruption ...................................... 780 
B.  Theories of Deterrence ............................................................. 781 
C.  Enforcement of the FCPA ......................................................... 783 
1.  Enforcement Authorities .................................................... 783 
2.  Growth in FCPA Enforcement ........................................... 784 
3.  Dearth of Case Law ........................................................... 786 
4.  Trends ................................................................................ 786 
D.  Legislative History ................................................................... 787 
E.  The Provisions of the FCPA ..................................................... 790 
F.  Sanctions ................................................................................... 793 
1.  Criminal Sanctions ............................................................. 793 
2.  Civil Sanctions ................................................................... 795 
3.  U.S. Sentencing Guidelines ............................................... 795 
4.  Alternative Fines Act ......................................................... 796 
5.  Confiscation of Bribery and Proceeds of Bribery .............. 797 
a.  Civil Disgorgement ...................................................... 797 
b.  Civil Forfeiture ............................................................ 797 
6.  Prohibition from Participating in Public 
Contracts/Advantages ....................................................... 797 
II.  BAE SYSTEMS:  A CASE STUDY OF CORRUPTION ............................... 798 
III.  DEBARMENT AS A METHOD OF DETERRING FOREIGN CORRUPTION . 802 
A.  The Fallacy of Corporate Fines as a Deterrent........................ 802 
1.  Corruption as a Cost of Doing Business ............................ 802 
2.  Mixed Messages Sent by Monetary Sanctions .................. 803 
3.  Abusive Monetary Sanctions ............................................. 804 
B.  The Law of Suspension and Debarment ................................... 806 
2011] TOO BIG TO DEBAR? 777 
C.  Suspension and Debarment as a “Corporate Death 
Sentence” ................................................................................ 807 
D.  Benefits of Debarment .............................................................. 807 
1.  Increased Compliance Without Increased Enforcement 
Costs .................................................................................. 807 
2.  Increased Self-Disclosure Without Increased 
Enforcement Costs ............................................................ 808 
E.  The Discretionary Debarment Decision ................................... 809 
1.  Are Corrupt Government Contractors “Too Big to 
Debar”? ............................................................................. 809 
2.  Prosecutors’ Influence over Debarment Decisions ............ 810 
F.  H.R. 5366:  Overseas Contractor Reform Act .......................... 811 
G.  The “Collateral Consequences” of Debarment ....................... 813 
1.  Concern for Diplomatic Consequences .............................. 815 
2.  Concern for Creating a Monopoly ..................................... 816 
3.  Concern for Economic Consequences of Overdeterrence . 818 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 820 
INTRODUCTION 
“A bribe is seen as a charm by the one who gives it; they think success 
will come at every turn.”1
Bribery of foreign officials by American businesses is a serious enough 
problem that Congress criminalized it in 1977 with the passage of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
 
2 (FCPA).  Enforcement of the FCPA has 
been on the rise in recent years, as have the penalties.3  Despite the 
dramatic escalation in fines and imprisonment for the violations,4 a 
particularly potent sanction to combat overseas bribery remains unused; that 
is, debarment of the firm from future contracts with the United States.5
 
 1. Proverbs 17:8 (NIV). 
  
Many of the firms caught bribing foreign government officials have 
 2. See Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 
to -3 (2006)). 
 3. See, e.g., Priya Cherian Huskins, FCPA Prosecutions:  Liability Trend to Watch, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1449–51 (2008). 
 4. See id. 
 5. The FCPA does not mention debarment as a sanction; instead, it is available under 
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). See FAR 9.406-5 (2010).  Federal prosecutors 
maintain that an FCPA violation may result in a company’s suspension or debarment from 
future government contracts. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES TO 
QUESTIONS CONCERNING PHASE 3, OECD WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY at 45 (May 3, 2010) 
[hereinafter RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES, QUESTIONS CONCERNING PHASE 3].  Such a 
penalty would have a significant impact on a company’s bottom line, particularly if the 
company deals in national defense, oil services, or any other industry that largely relies on 
government business to stay afloat.  From a law and economics perspective, the threat of 
debarment is perhaps one of the best ways to deter these companies from committing FCPA 
violations. 
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extensive contracts with a number of domestic federal agencies,6
Even so, the federal agencies enforcing the FCPA—the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)—have 
avoided exposing certain companies to potential debarment in even the 
most egregious cases of foreign corruption, citing concern for the 
“collateral consequences” that might result from a debarred company’s 
collapse.  This raises the question:  are certain government contractors too 
big to debar?  As this Article demonstrates, it appears so.  Consequently, 
the handful of private entities responsible for satisfying the vast majority of 
outsourced United States contracts have enjoyed bailouts from agency 
officials who refuse to sanction corrupt practices through suspension or 
debarment.  This situation leads to the jaded viewpoint that paying fines 
when caught bribing foreign officials “simply become[s] a cost of doing 
business.”
 meaning 
debarment would be a particularly devastating punishment.  Therefore, the 
threat of debarment, even for the standard two-year period, would serve as a 
singularly effective deterrent against such corruption; firms can recover and 
rebound from a large fine much more easily than from a loss of all 
government contracts, even for a limited time. 
7
As discussed in Part I, not only does this practice deepen our nation’s 
entanglement with those who are undermining fledgling democracies 
overseas, agencies that continue to award billions of dollars in federal 
funding to contractors prosecuted for peddling bribes abroad send mixed 
messages about the United States’ commitment to accountability and 
transparency in foreign markets.  The government’s failure to sever its 
partnership with a company after exposing egregious acts of foreign 
corruption undermines our nation’s credibility as a beacon of best practices 
to the increasingly global marketplace.  From a less altruistic perspective, 
with zero risk of debarment and minimal risk of detection, companies have 
little incentive to comply with the FCPA when the fines imposed make up a 
fraction of the profit generated from foreign business procured through 
bribery.  Without the realistic threat of debarment, companies partnering 
with the United States have little incentive to withdraw from the black 
market of foreign bribery. 
 
To help illuminate these concerns, Part II of this Article will examine the 
third largest8 FCPA-related9
 
 6. 95.2 percent of BAE Systems’ revenue in 2009 came from defense-related contracts. 
Defense News Top 100 for 2009, DEFENSE NEWS (June 28, 2010), 
 enforcement action to date, the BAE Systems 
http://defensenews.com/static/features/top100/charts/rank_2009.php?c=FEA&s=T1C. 
 7. Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act:  Joint Hearing on S. 430 
Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Fin. & Monetary Policy and the Subcomm. on Sec. of the 
Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 99th Cong. 2 (1986) (response of John C. 
Keeney, Deputy Att’y Gen., Criminal Division, DOJ, to written questions of Sen. Alfonse 
D’Amato). 
 8. Siemens holds the number one spot of the top FCPA prosecutions based on fines and 
penalties.  In 2008, the company pleaded guilty and paid a fine of roughly $800 million for 
paying bribes across the world.  The second largest FCPA prosecution involved Kellogg 
Brown & Root (KBR), which, along with its former corporate parent Halliburton, paid $579 
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case.  On March 1, 2010, BAE Systems PLC paid approximately $400 
million in fines for its corrupt practices abroad.10  Nevertheless, within a 
year, BAE won federal contracts in excess of $6 billion.11  Evidence 
suggests that this is not an isolated coincidence.12
Part III helps frame the debarment debate by first revealing why fines are 
largely inconsistent with the United States’ stated goal of rooting out 
corruption in foreign markets.  This part then canvasses the law of 
suspension and debarment, and explains how these potent penalties are 
often the functional equivalent of sentencing a corporation to death.  After 
explaining the benefits that may flow from an agency’s increased use of 
discretionary suspension and debarment (namely, its deterrent effect on 
foreign corruption), Part III considers the collateral consequences of 
sanctioning FCPA violations in such a harsh manner. 
  Yet this practice has 
gone largely unnoticed by the academic literature on the FCPA. 
After reviewing the Overseas Contractor Reform Act and teasing out the 
competing interests at stake—deterring foreign corruption while avoiding 
the collateral consequences of severely sanctioning corrupt contractors too 
big to debar—this Article concludes that the United States must begin to 
diversify its portfolio of federal contractors so that prosecutors may 
leverage the legitimate threat of debarment to deter foreign corruption more 
 
million in connection with bribes paid to undercover agents posing as Nigerian officials. See 
Leslie Benton et al., Anti-Corruption, 45 INT’L LAW. 345, 347 (2011); Bruce Hinchey, 
Punishing the Penitent:  Disproportionate Fines in Recent FCPA Enforcements and 
Suggested Improvements, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 393, 406–07 (2011); Jon Jordan, Recent 
Developments in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the New UK Bribery Act:  A Global 
Trend Towards Greater Accountability in the Prevention of Foreign Bribery, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. 
& BUS. 845, 855–56 (2011). 
 9. As discussed below, BAE was technically not prosecuted for violating the FCPA; 
rather, its acts of bribery were prosecuted under the more general 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006) 
for submitting false statements by misrepresenting the nature of its bribe payments to the 
government. See infra Part III. 
 10. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered 
to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2010/March/10-crm-209.html.  According to the DOJ’s press release, BAE Systems 
PLC “is a multinational defense contractor with headquarters in the United Kingdom and 
with a U.S. subsidiary—BAE Systems Inc.—headquartered in Rockville, Md.  None of the 
criminal conduct described in the plea involved the actions of BAE Systems Inc.” Id. 
 11. See Prime Award Spending Data for BAE Systems PLC, Fiscal Year 2010, 
USASPENDING.GOV, http://www.usaspending.gov/explore?fromfiscal=yes&fiscal_year=2011
&contractorid=243604&fiscal_year=2010&tab=By+Prime+Awardee&fromfiscal=yes&carr
yfilters=on&Submit=Go (last visited Oct. 20, 2011) (reporting that U.S. agencies awarded 
BAE $6,619,991,720 in “prime awards” during the fiscal year 2010 in 13,238 transactions).  
As of August 31, 2011, domestic government agencies have awarded BAE $3,663,155,093 
in “prime award” contracts in 7,825 transactions. Prime Award Data for BAE Systems PLC, 
Fiscal Year 2011, USASPENDING.GOV, http://www.usaspending.gov/explore?fromfiscal=
yes&fiscal_year=2010&contractorid=243604&fiscal_year=2011&tab=By+Prime+Awardee
&fromfiscal=yes&carryfilters=on&Submit=Go (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
 12. See, e.g., Steven L. Schooner, The Paper Tiger Stirs:  Rethinking Suspension and 
Debarment, 13 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 211, 214 (2004) (“With fewer major, critical 
contractors available to compete for the Government’s most sophisticated requirements, it 
seems disingenuous to bar a key player from future competition.  Such behaviour might be 
described as cutting off one’s nose to spite one’s face.”). 
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effectively.  In short, by rewarding subsequent lucrative contracts to firms 
fined for engaging in foreign corruption, the United States reinforces the 
perception that bribery brings success, as observed in the quote above from 
the book of Proverbs.  The only way to change this perception, and in turn 
purify foreign markets polluted by corruption, is to end the government’s 
subsidization of companies that carry out United States business in a 
corrupt manner. 
 I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Dark Side of Foreign Corruption 
“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”13
The cancerous effect of corruption abroad can quickly spread through the 
increasingly global marketplace and ultimately wreak havoc on the 
economy at home.
 
14  During a 2010 speech, Assistant Attorney General 
Lanny Breuer pointed to the estimated $1 trillion in worldwide bribes paid 
each year15 as evidence of just how severely such foreign corruption 
“undermines the health of international markets [by] stifling competition 
and repelling foreign investment.”16  In emerging economies, Breuer 
further explained that the routine bribery of officials means that “[r]oads are 
not built, schools lie in ruin, and basic public services go unprovided.”17
There are several other toxic side effects of foreign bribery, such as its 
subsidization of terrorism and brutal tyrants.  Companies that routinely 
engage in corrupt business practices abroad play an active role in helping 
maintain the “ungoverned states” that “continue to export poverty and serve 




 13. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 
(1914). 
  For example, 
investigators revealed that Siemens’ indiscriminate use of its “web of secret 
 14. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 268 (7th ed. 2007) 
(“How destructive, economically, is corruption . . . ?  Perhaps very, because the heaviest 
burden falls on innovation.” (citing Kevin M. Murphy et al., Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly 
to Growth?, 83 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 409, 412–13 (1993))). 
 15. Lanny A. Breuer, Asst. Att’y Gen., Speech at the United Nations for International 
Anti-corruption Day (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2010/crm-
speech-101209.html [hereinafter Anti-corruption Day Speech]; see also Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Governance and Corruption, in GLOBAL CRISES, GLOBAL SOLUTIONS 301, 301 
(Bjorn Lomborg ed., 2004). 
 16. Anti-corruption Day Speech, supra note 15; see also Cortney C. Thomas, Note, The 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:  A Decade of Rapid Expansion Explained, Defended, and 
Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439, 441 (2010) (“Bribery inhibits economic growth by two 
primary mechanisms:  economic inefficiency and reduced investment.”). 
 17. Anti-corruption Day Speech, supra note 15. 
 18. Paul D. Carrington, Enforcing International Corrupt Practices Law, 32 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 129, 131 (2010); see also Lanny A. Breuer, Asst. Att’y Gen., Speech at the 3rd 
Russia & Commonwealth of Independent States Summit on Anti-corruption (Mar. 16, 2011), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech-110316.html 
(“[C]orruption is a ‘gateway crime,’ allowing money laundering, gang violence, terrorism 
and other crimes to thrive.”). 
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bank accounts and shadowy consultants” to secure government contracts 
abroad resulted in “$1.7 million to Saddam Hussein and his cronies.”19
The Executive Branch has similarly identified foreign bribery as a threat 
to national security.  As part of his post-9/11 foreign policy, President 
George W. Bush acknowledged corruption’s “serious adverse effects 
on . . . the security of the United States against transnational crime and 
terrorism.”
 
20  The Obama Administration has similarly “recogni[zed] that 
pervasive corruption is a violation of basic human rights and a severe 
impediment to development and global security.”21
In addition to its destructive economic consequences and links to 
terrorism, the spread of foreign corruption has produced several other side 
effects worth mentioning.  For example, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
goods and services procured through corruption are more likely to be at 
best, defective, and at worst, deadly.
 
22  Likewise, businesses that resort to 
bribery abroad are more likely to bring the practice home.23  For those 
concerned about nurturing democracy and free markets in developing 
countries, American companies that bribe foreign officials also undermine 
confidence in open governance and open markets.24
B.  Theories of Deterrence 
 
Given the dire consequences associated with the spread of corruption in 
foreign lands, it is no surprise that central to the DOJ’s mission of “rooting 
 
 19. Siri Schubert & T. Christian Miller, Where Bribery Was Just a Line Item, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008, at C1. 
 20. Proclamation No. 7750, To Suspend Entry as Immigrants or Nonimmigrants of 
Persons Engaged in or Benefiting from Corruption, 69 Fed. Reg. 2287 (Jan. 12, 2004). 
 21. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 38 (2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf;  
see also Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Address at the Opening Plenary of the VI Ministerial 
Global Forum on Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity (Nov. 7, 2009), 
http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-091107.html  (“President Obama has 
said, ‘The struggle against corruption is one of the great struggles of our time.’”). 
 22. See, e.g., Nicholas Ambraseys & Roger Bilham, Corruption Kills, 469 NATURE 153, 
153–55 (2011); Testimony of POGO’s Danielle Brian on “Contractor Debarment and 
Suspension:  A Broken System,” Before the George Washington Law School, PROJECT ON 
GOV’T OVERSIGHT (POGO) (Nov. 20, 2003), http://www.pogo.org/pogo-
files/testimony/contract-oversight/co-fcm-20031120.html (“Why is it that the government 
continues to do the bulk of its business with companies that have . . . knowingly supplied 
defective helicopter parts to the government, that have resulted in the deaths of service men 
and women; or falsified tests on the cruise missile?”). 
 23. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 18, at 140 (“German observers have also expressed 
support because of concerns that German firms engaged in corruption abroad may have 
brought the practices home, i.e., that ‘globalization has become a motor for corruption in 
Germany.’” (citing Carter Dougherty, Germany Battling Rising Tide of Corporate 
Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2007, at C1)). 
 24. See United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Michael S. 
Diamant et al., Corruption Crackdown:  The FCPA and Recent Enforcement Trends, 
Presentation at Global Economic Crime Survey & Anti-Corruption/FCPA Seminar, 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS & GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP (Nov. 24, 2009), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Diamant-FCPAandRecent
EnforcementTrends.pdf. 
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out foreign bribery”25 is its ability to send “a very strong deterrent 
message”26 with each prosecution.  In analyzing the deterrent effect of a 
given law, the traditional law and economics model operates on the basic 
assumption that people generally take calculative steps to advance their own 
self-interest.27  Working from this assumption, Judge Richard Posner, “a 
veritable patriarch of deterrence theory,”28 has stated, “The 
primary . . . function of law, in an economic perspective, is to alter 
incentives.”29
Within this framework, a corporate executive, manager, or agent has a 
rational incentive to pay bribes overseas where the anticipated pecuniary 
benefits exceed the anticipated costs of criminal punishment.
 
30
On the other side of this equation, Judge Posner identifies two key 
mechanisms for controlling the expected costs of criminal punishment—the 
amount of law enforcement activity and the severity of punishment.
  The 
expected pecuniary benefit to a corporation that engages in bribery is, of 
course, the profit it generates with the government contracts procured 
through its corrupt practices.  At the individual level, an employee’s 
willingness to pay an occasional bribe or kickback to grease their supply 
chain or win a lucrative contract for their company may be quite tempting 
given the variety of benefits that may result:  a promotion, a raise, a bonus, 
etc. 
31
The DOJ and SEC have successfully increased their ability to detect 
foreign bribery,
  
Bribe payers, just like any other class of criminals, respond to incentives 
and perceived opportunity costs, which include punishments and the 
probability of getting caught.   
32 and have been equally effective at levying massive fines 
to punish such corrupt practices.33
 
 25. Lanny A. Breuer, Asst. Att’y Gen., Address at the 24th National Conference on the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/pr/speeches/2010/crm-speech-101116.html. 
  Even so, it undermines the 
government’s ability to deter continued corruption when one of the 
 26. Skip Kaltenheuser, Anti-corruption–US Leads the Way, INT’L BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=21F61C45-0318-41F6-89F8-
3E8C01EC57B1 (last visited Oct. 20, 2011) (quoting then-head of enforcement of the DOJ, 
Mark Mendelsohn). 
 27. See POSNER, supra note 14, at 4 (“[M]an is a rational utility maximizer in all areas of 
life.”); Dru Stevenson, Toward a New Theory of Notice and Deterrence, 26 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1535, 1544–45 (2005) (“The traditional economic model assumes that people 
maximize their self-interest . . . .”). 
 28. Stevenson, supra note 27, at 1552. 
 29. POSNER, supra note 14, at 266. 
 30. Id. at 219; see also David C. Weiss, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC 
Disgorgement of Profits, and the Evolving International Bribery Regime:  Weighing 
Proportionality, Retribution, and Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 506 (2009) (“A 
perfectly deterrent punishment scheme would set the level of punishment at the level of the 
expected gains of participating in the criminal behavior.”). 
 31. POSNER, supra note 14, at 219. 
 32. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 33. See infra Part I.C.2. 
2011] TOO BIG TO DEBAR? 783 
potential costs of engaging in such corruption—a company’s suspension or 
debarment from partnering with the United States—is never at issue.34
C.  Enforcement of the FCPA 
 
The DOJ maintains that FCPA enforcement helps eliminate foreign 
corruption where it already exists, and deters it from taking root in new 
situations.35  Indeed, the DOJ has succeeded impressively in ratcheting up 
enforcement in recent years.36  Executives reportedly spend sleepless nights 
wondering if their company will be the next target of an FCPA enforcement 
action.37  On display in the DOJ and SEC’s ever-expanding FCPA trophy 
case are such blue-chip staples as General Electric, KBR/Halliburton, and 
Tyson Foods.38
1.  Enforcement Authorities 
 
The DOJ, responsible for prosecuting criminal violations of the FCPA,39 
and the SEC, responsible for prosecuting civil violations of the FCPA,40
 
 34. See Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:   Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of the U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 
54, 66 (2010) (prepared statement of Professor Mike Koehler) [hereinafter Koehler 
Statement].  In his prepared statement delivered before Senator Arlen Specter and other 
members of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Professor Koehler wrote, 
 
  Deterrence is not achieved . . . when U.S. government agencies continue to 
award multi-million dollar contracts to companies in the immediate aftermath of 
bribery scandals. 
  In order for the DOJ’s deterrence message to be completely heard and 
understood egregious instances of corporate bribery that legitimately satisfy the 
elements of an FCPA anti-bribery violation involving high-level executives and/or 
board participation should be followed with debarment proceedings against the 
offender. 
Id. 
 35. Breuer, supra note 25.  
 36. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 37. See Nathan Vardi, The Bribery Racket, FORBES (May 28, 2010, 10:20 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/global/2010/0607/companies-payoffs-washington-extortion-
mendelsohn-bribery-racket.html (quoting Lucinda Low, an FCPA specialist as saying, 
“[T]he scope of things companies have to worry about is enlarging all the time as the 
government asserts violations in circumstances where it’s unclear if they would prevail in 
court.”). 
 38. See SEC v. General Electric Co., No. 1:10-CV-01258 (D.D.C. 2010); SEC v. 
Halliburton Co., No. 4:09-cv-399 (S.D. Tex. 2009); United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root 
LLC, No. H-09-071 (S.D. Tex. 2009); United States v. Halliburton Co., 4:09-CV-399 (S.D. 
Tex. 2009); Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Tyson Foods Inc., No. 1:11-
cr-00037 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2011). 
 39. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:  Antibribery Provisions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
2, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-persons-guide.pdf (last visited Oct. 
20, 2011) (“The Department of Justice is responsible for all criminal enforcement and for 
civil enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions with respect to domestic concerns and 
foreign companies and nationals.”); see also Thomas, supra note 16, at 444 n.27 (“Though 
not precluded by statute, the DOJ does not enforce the accounting provisions often, if 
ever.”). 
 40. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 39, at 2 (“The SEC is responsible for civil 
enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions with respect to issuers.”); see also Thomas, supra 
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together with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), form the trifecta of 
federal agencies tasked with investigating and enforcing the FCPA.  Each 
agency publicizes its stance on rooting out foreign corruption.41
2.  Growth in FCPA Enforcement 
 
Congress has poured millions of dollars into these agencies to help fund 
their ambitious anticorruption initiatives.  Some commentators have 
observed that, in recent years, the DOJ has “substantially enlarged its 
efforts to enforce corrupt practices law”42 by initiating “discussions with 
the Internal Revenue Service’s Criminal Investigation Division about 
partnering with [the DOJ] on FCPA cases,” in addition to “pursuing 
strategic partnerships with certain U.S. Attorney’s Offices throughout the 
United States where there are a concentration of FCPA investigations.”43
In 2007, the FBI created a new unit dedicated solely to handling FCPA 
probes.
 
44  The SEC similarly stepped up its enforcement efforts in 2009 by 
creating a special FCPA unit that “focus[es] on new and proactive 
approaches to identifying violations” by “being more proactive in 
investigations, working more closely with [its] foreign counterparts, and 
taking a more global approach to these violations.”45
The robust growth of FCPA-focused units within these agencies has 
unsurprisingly translated into robust enforcement of the FCPA.  Following 
an initial flurry of activity immediately after its enactment in 1977, the 






 and no more than $35.2 million in total fines during 
16, at 444 n.27 (“The SEC has typically been the safeguard of the accounting 
provisions, using civil actions such as injunctions to enforce the Act when the DOJ might not 
be able to bring criminal charges under the anti-bribery provisions.”). 
 41. See, e.g., Alice S. Fisher, Asst. Att’y Gen., Prepared Remarks at the American Bar 
Association National Institute on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Oct. 16, 2006), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/pr/speech/2006/10-16-06AAGFCPA
Speech.pdf (“At the outset, let me address the most basic questions some of you might have 
about the government’s attitude toward FCPA enforcement.  Do we care about the FCPA?  
Is the FCPA relevant in today’s global business climate?  Is enforcing the FCPA a high 
priority?  The answer to all of those questions is yes.  Prosecuting corruption of all kinds is a 
high priority for the Justice Department and for me as head of the Criminal Division.”); 
Lanny A. Breuer, Asst. Att’y Gen., Speech at the Annual Meeting of the Washington 
Metropolitan Area Corporate Counsel (Jan. 26, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech-110126.html (“As an initial 
matter, in the Criminal Division we have dramatically increased our enforcement of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in recent years.”). 
 42. Carrington, supra note 18, at 136. 
 43. Lanny A. Breuer, Asst. Att’y Gen., Speech at the 22nd National Forum on the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 17, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/pr/speeches-testimony/documents/11-17-09aagbreuer-remarks-fcpa.pdf.  
 44. Sue Reisinger, Why Are More Companies Self-Reporting Overseas Bribes?, 
LAW.COM (July 16, 2007), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005486003. 
 45. Robert Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC, Remarks Before the New York 
City Bar:  My First 100 Days as Director of Enforcement (Aug. 5, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch080509rk.htm. 
 46. John Gibeaut, Battling Bribery Abroad, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 18, 2007, 5:05 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/battling_bribery_abroad/. 
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that period.47  The number of FCPA enforcement actions increased 
modestly from 2004 (five) to 2005 (twelve), and then again in 2006 
(fifteen).48  Beginning in 2007, however, the DOJ and SEC brought thirty-
eight enforcement actions in a single year49—a 153 percent increase from 
the previous year.  This trend held steady in 2008 and 2009, with thirty-
three and forty enforcement actions, respectively.50
The DOJ’s then-chief FCPA prosecutor, Mark Mendelsohn, stated his 
desire for the Department to sustain its rapidly increasing enforcement 
actions.
 
51  With an estimated $644 million in FCPA-related sanctions 
imposed by the United States in 2009,52 a total of forty enforcement actions 
brought by the DOJ and SEC in 2010,53 and numerous ongoing 
investigations,54 the DOJ has adhered to Mendelsohn’s vision, although he 
has left the DOJ for private practice.  The explosion of enforcement of the 
FCPA in recent years has allowed federal prosecutors to squeeze vast sums 
of wealth out of companies prosecuted under the Act.  Congress’s 
investment in anticorruption enforcement appears to have “abundantly 
reimbursed the national treasury”55 and produced a significant “return on 
investment.”56  With backing from the Obama Administration,57
 
 47. Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens:  The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act—1977 to 
2010, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 89, 103 (2010).  The number of FCPA actions during its first 
twenty to twenty-five years varies slightly by author. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 
 the 
continued climb in the number of FCPA-related investigations and 
enforcement actions shows no signs of slowing in 2012 and beyond. 
16, at 
449 (“Twenty years after the FCPA’s passage, only seventeen companies and thirty-three 
individuals faced prosecution.”).  Despite disagreement over the number of FCPA 
prosecutions during this period, it is clear that “[d]uring the first two decades of the FCPA, 
enforcement was ‘sporadic’ at best.” Id. at 448. 
 48. See 2010 Mid-year FCPA Update, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP (July 8, 2010), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2010Mid-YearFCPAUpdate.aspx. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See Mendelsohn Says Criminal Bribery Prosecutions Doubled in 2007, 22 CORP. 
CRIME REP. 36(1) (2008). 
 52. John E. Kelly et al., White Collar Crime:  FCPA Enforcement Update, 34 CHAMPION 
56, 56 (2010). 
 53. 2010 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP (Jan. 3, 2011), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2010YearEndFCPAUpdate.pdf. 
 54. See id.  For more discussion of FCPA investigations earlier in the decade, see 
Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of Authority:  The Department of 
Justice’s Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 1–3 (2006) (highlighting 
prosecutions from 2002–05). 
 55. Carrington, supra note 18, at 136. 
 56. Protecting American Taxpayers:  Significant Accomplishments and Ongoing 
Challenges in the Fight Against Fraud:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter Protecting American Taxpayers] (statement of Sen. 
Franken) (“I just want to ask something about return on investment . . . .  For every dollar 
invested in [healthcare procurement fraud] investigations, we get back $17.  And what I’m 
wondering is would you like more resources, and can they be used . . . [to] reduc[e] our 
deficit by spending more money . . . .”). 
 57. See Holder, supra note 21. 
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3.  Dearth of Case Law 
The DOJ and SEC have posted a record-breaking number of FCPA 
prosecutions in recent years, and have extracted vast sums of wealth from 
companies across the globe, yet courts have played a very small role in the 
FCPA’s substantive expansion.  Although individuals faced with 
incarceration have been less reluctant to challenge FCPA enforcement 
actions in court, fearing the negative publicity that might result from an 
FCPA trial, most companies have chosen to sweep charges under the rug by 
entering into a plea agreement.  And prosecutors have been more than 
willing to plea bargain with multinational firms willing to accept massive 
fines to move on.  As a result, “no business entity has publicly challenged 
either enforcement agency in an FCPA case in the last twenty years.”58
4.  Trends 
 
The combination of robust enforcement and minimal judicial oversight 
has produced a number of trends unique to the FCPA.  The first major trend 
to emerge in recent years is the DOJ’s increased criminal prosecution of 
individuals.59  Prosecutors have focused particular attention on corporate 
executives and high-level managers who fail to instill a culture that 
encourages transparency and compliance.60  Moreover, although the FCPA 
has not typically reached individuals on the receiving end of a bribe, the 
DOJ has nevertheless deployed a variety of untested tactics to “target 
‘foreign official’ recipients of bribe payments.”61
Several distinct trends have emerged in the prosecution of commercial 
entities as well.  Prosecutors have imposed vicarious liability on parent 
companies for the corrupt practices of their subsidiaries.
 
62  The DOJ has 
also stepped up its prosecution of foreign entities,63 which conveniently 
avoids the political backlash that often accompanies corruption charges 
brought against domestic employers.  That said, domestic corporations have 
certainly not been immune from prosecution under the FCPA.  The DOJ, 
SEC, and FBI have increasingly focused on using “industry-wide sweeps” 
to prosecute FCPA violations efficiently, a practice in which “no industry is 
immune from investigation.”64
 
 58. Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its Decade 
of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 406 (2010). 
  Specifically, prosecutors have targeted the 
 59. See id. 
 60. See Colleen A. Conry, Complying with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the 
Global Healthcare Industry, 3 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1, 1 (2010). 
 61. Koehler, supra note 58, at 405. 
 62. See Justin F. Marceau, A Little Less Conversation, a Little More Action:  Evaluating 
and Forecasting the Trend of More Frequent and Severe Prosecutions Under the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 285, 296 (2007). 
 63. See Thomas, supra note 16, at 460. 
 64. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Seven Oil Services and Freight Forwarding 
Companies for Widespread Bribery of Customs Officials (Nov. 4, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-214.htm. 
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tobacco, telecommunications, healthcare, and defense industries.65  A 
related development in recent FCPA enforcement involved the “landmark 
SHOT Show sting operation” in which hundreds of federal agents 
descended on a Las Vegas trade convention to serve warrants to industry 
participants suspected of paying bribes to “FBI agents posing as 
representatives of the Gabonese Ministry of Defense.”66
In addition to the increased criminal prosecution of individuals, 
aggressive enforcement against entities, and industry-wide investigations, 
much of the FCPA’s success (or notoriety) is attributable to the growing 
number of companies that voluntarily disclose potential violations.  The 
DOJ and SEC, realizing the incentive-altering force of massive sanctions, 
have parlayed a handful of highly publicized multi-million dollar 
prosecutions into many more self-disclosures by companies hoping for 
more lenient sentencing.
 
67  As one author pointed out, “The best evidence 
that the DOJ’s current enforcement of the FCPA deters bribery is in the 
sheer numbers of self-disclosers in recent years.”68
D.  Legislative History 
 
The FCPA has a rather peculiar genesis.  Ironically, the issue of 
international corruption was first thrust into the spotlight not because of 
events abroad, but rather events at home—the Watergate scandal.  The year 
was 1973 and Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox had requested 
that companies involved in President Nixon’s reelection campaign come 
forward and admit their illicit dealings.69  The response from Corporate 
America exposed not only the rampant corruption that led to President 
Nixon’s resignation, but also the international market for black money.70
Understandably concerned about the pervasive international corruption 
brought to light during Watergate, the SEC initiated what was perhaps the 




 65. See generally 2010 Year-End FCPA Update, supra note 
 as well as the first 
53, at 10–20 (describing 
efforts against these industries specifically). 
 66. Id. at 15. 
 67. See Bixby, supra note 47, at 115. 
 68. Thomas, supra note 16, at 467; see also Weiss, supra note 30, at 483. 
 69. See André M. Peñalver, Note, Corporate Disconnect:  The Blackwater Problem and 
the FCPA Solution, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 459, 469 (2010). 
 70. See id. (reporting that inquiries by federal investigators of the Watergate scandal 
uncovered a “series of foreign bribery scandals by a number of Fortune 500 companies”). 
 71. See Alejandro Posadas, Combating Corruption Under International Law, 10 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 345, 349 (2000).  One historical account describes these actions as 
follows: 
[T]he Securities and Exchange Commission . . . initiated its own investigations, 
and in 1975 it moved against four major companies:  Gulf Oil Corporation, 
Phillips Petroleum Company, Northrop Corporation, and Ashland Oil, Inc.  The 
SEC alleged that the establishment of secret slush funds for unaccountable 
distribution of moneys abroad violated U.S. securities law requiring that public 
companies file accurate financial statements. 
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voluntary disclosure program for unreported foreign bribes.72  Shortly 
thereafter, Congress set out to assess the seriousness of foreign 
corruption.73  What it uncovered has been described as “the most extensive 
documentation of business-government corruption ever produced in 
history.”74
In 1976, Senator William Proxmire introduced Senate Bill 3313 and 
persuaded Congress of the need to enact what would become a “pioneering 
statute at the time” because it was “the first ever domestic statute governing 
the conduct of domestic companies in their interactions . . . with foreign 
government officials in foreign markets.”
 
75  In rejecting President Ford’s 
more lenient proposal76 in favor of legislation that criminalized both the 
failure to report bribery and the act itself,77 Congress expressed its belief 
that the cost of getting caught bribing foreign officials must be high, 
otherwise “many companies will continue paying bribes if they can get 
away with it, because the potential rewards are so great and the risks are 
minimal.”78
In drafting the FCPA, Congress wrestled with several difficult questions 
concerning the scope of its new statute.  Three questions garnered 
particularly vigorous debate.  The first was whether a requirement that a 
company fully disclose its corrupt dealings with foreign officials could 
backfire and hurt the United States’ diplomatic relations (Congress decided 
full disclosure was more important).
 
79  The second was whether stopping 
the flow of bribe money abroad would hurt United States relations with 
allied nations where bribery was customary (Congress dismissed this 
concern by pointing out that most foreign countries prohibit bribery despite 
local custom).80
 
Id. (citing The Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad:  Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Int’l Econ. Policy of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 94th Cong. 2 (1975) 
[hereinafter Multinational Corporations Hearings]). 
  Finally, debate centered on whether the FCPA would 
 72. Id. at 350. 
 73. See Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy:  Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Multinational Corps. of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93rd Cong. 5 
(1975). 
 74. Posadas, supra note 71, at 350.  Posadas’s article provides a comprehensive list of 
sources that report the FCPA’s legislative history from 1975–77. See id. at 350 n.10. 
 75. Koehler Statement, supra note 34, at 2. 
 76. See Message from the President of the United States, Foreign Payments Disclosure 
Act, H.R. Doc. No. 94-572, at 1 (1976).  The Ford Administration’s proposed bill required 
that companies report “certain classes for foreign payments made by U.S. corporations (only 
significantly large payments), but would not make these payments unlawful as long as they 
complied with other existing applicable law.  This was a conservative approach.” Posadas, 
supra note 71, at 356. 
 77. See Foreign Payments Disclosure:  Hearings on H.R. 15481 and S. 3664 Before the 
Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. & Fin. of the Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 94th 
Cong. (1976). 
 78. Foreign and Corporate Bribes:  Hearings on S. 3133 Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 1 (1976) (statement of Sen. William Proxmire). 
 79. See Multinational Corporations Hearings, supra note 71, at 22; see also Posadas, 
supra note 71, at 358. 
 80. See Multinational Corporations Hearings, supra note 71, at 24; see also Posadas, 
supra note 71, at 358. 
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place American businesses at a serious disadvantage by prohibiting a 
practice that foreign companies were still free to engage in81 (Congress 
rejected this too, opting to force American companies to take the high road 
instead).82
After resolving the remaining points of contention and carving out an 
exception for “grease payments,”
 
83 Senate Bill 305 passed in both houses84 
and President Carter signed it into law on December 19, 1977.85  This was 
the birth of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  With the exception of a 
proposed amendment to quell concerns that the FCPA was overburdening 
American businesses,86
In 1988, concern over the FCPA’s chilling effect on American 
companies’ willingness to pursue opportunities abroad resurfaced, 
ultimately leading to the first of two amendments to the FCPA.
 the decade that followed was uneventful. 
87  Although 
the amendment left the FCPA’s two-prong structure intact,88 it created two 
affirmative defenses and elevated the grease payment exception from the 
accounting prong to its present position as a stand-alone exception.89  The 
amendment created one affirmative defense for promotion or hospitality 
expenses,90 and a second affirmative defense for bribes made pursuant to 
written law of the country in which the bribe was paid.91
 
 81. See Posadas, supra note 
 
71, at 358.  Congress did make some concessions, however, 
carving out an exception for “so-called ‘grease’ payments such as payments for expediting 
shipments through customs or placing a transatlantic telephone call, securing required 
permits, or obtaining adequate police protection, transactions which may involve even the 
proper performance of duties.” S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1977 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4108; see also H.R. Rep. No. 95-640 (1977). 
 82. See Posadas, supra note 71, at 358 (“[I]t appears that Congress ultimately adopted 
sanctions because it simply considered the practice to be wrong.”). 
 83. See S. Rep. No. 95-114; see also H.R. Rep. No. 95-640 (discussing the legislative 
history behind the “grease payments” exception). 
 84. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-831 (1977); 123 CONG. REC. 38,599, 38,779 (1977). 
 85. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to dd-2 (2006)). 
 86. See Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act:  Joint Hearings on 
S. 708 Before the Subcomm. on Sec. & the Subcomm. on Int’l Fin. & Monetary Policy of the 
Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong. 1 (1981).  The Senate joint 
hearings on the proposed amendment focused on “whether the [FCPA], including both its 
antibribery and accounting provisions, [was] the best approach [to deterring foreign 
corruption], or whether it has created unnecessary costs and burdens out of proportion to the 
purposes for which it was enacted, and whether it serves our national interest.” Id. (statement 
of Sen. D’Amato).  Senator John Chafee echoed these concerns:  “We’ve learned that the 
best of intentions can go awry and create confusion and great cost to our economy.” Id. at 8. 
 87. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, tit. V, subtit. A, pt. I, §§ 5001–5003, 102 Stat. 
1107, 1415–25. 
 88. See infra notes 98–100 and accompanying text (discussing the FCPA’s two-prong 
structure); see also Otto G. Obermaier & Robert G. Morvillo, The Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, in 2 WHITE COLLAR CRIME:  BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES § 16.04 (Robert J. 
Anello et al. eds., 1990). 
 89. See §§ 5001–5003, 102 Stat. at 1415–25.; see also H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at 916–
20 (1988) (Conf. Rep.). 
 90. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2), 78dd-2(c)(2). 
 91. See infra Part I.E. 
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As globalization spread, 1988 was also an important year because it 
marked a “renewed awareness of international criminal activity” that would 
ultimately allow international “anti-corruption initiatives [to] flourish.”92  
In the years that followed, countries around the world joined (or at least 
claimed to join) the United States in its global war on corruption.93  In 
1997, thirty-two other nations joined the United States in signing the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Convention on 
Combating Bribery (OECD Convention) whereby each nation pledged to 
criminalize foreign bribery in its home country.94
One year later, in satisfaction of one of the United States’ obligations 
under the OECD Convention, President Clinton amended the FCPA for a 
second time by signing into law the International Anti-Bribery and Fair 
Competition Act of 1998 (International Anti-Bribery Act).
 
95  This 
amendment significantly expanded both the substantive and jurisdictional 
scope of the ever-growing statute.96  Although the DOJ has subsequently 
stretched the scope of the FCPA through a number of novel, untested 
theories of prosecution,97
E.  The Provisions of the FCPA 
 the International Anti-Bribery Act marks the last 
legislative expansion of the FCPA to date. 
The FCPA has two main prongs:  an anti-bribery prong and an 
accounting prong.  The FCPA’s anti-bribery prong prohibits employees and 
agents of a company98 from giving or offering cash, or anything else of 
value, to a foreign official in order to obtain or retain business.99
 
 92. Posadas, supra note 
  The 
FCPA’s accounting prong applies to a company (and its employees and 
71, at 370. 
 93. See Matt A. Vega, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Culture of Bribery:  Expanding 
the Scope of Private Whistleblower Suits to Overseas Employees, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 425, 
453 (2009) (describing numerous multilateral efforts to combat global corruption). 
 94. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1.  
 95. Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 
-3, 78ff (2006)).  
 96. See Thomas, supra note 16, at 447–48. 
 97. See generally Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 
907, 963–81, 998–1001 (2010). 
 98. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-2 to -3.  “Companies” subject to the FCPA’s 
jurisdiction include “U.S. companies (whether public or private) and its [sic] personnel; U.S. 
citizens; foreign companies with shares listed on a U.S. stock exchange or otherwise 
required to file reports with the SEC; or any person while in U.S. territory.” Koehler, supra 
note 97, at 913 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-1 to -3). 
 99. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a).  The FCPA makes it unlawful 
for any domestic concern . . . or for any officer, director, employee, or agent of 
such domestic concern . . . to make use of the mails or any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, 
payment, [or] promise to pay . . . anything of value to . . . any person, while 
knowing that all or a portion of such money . . . will be offered, given, or 
promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official . . . for purposes of . . . 
influencing any act or decision of such foreign official . . . in his . . . official 
capacity . . . . 
Id. 
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agents) only if it fits within the definition of an “issuer.”100  In the context 
of foreign bribery, the record-keeping provisions require issuers to maintain 
detailed, accurate records of all transactions overseas.101  The internal 
control provisions supplement the record-keeping provisions by requiring 
that issuers instill a corporate culture of transparency through various anti-
bribery policies and procedures, and holds managers accountable for the 
transactions that occur under their supervision.102  The broadly worded 
provisions of the FCPA reach all (1) “issuer[s],”103 (2) “domestic 
concern[s],”104 and (3) any “person” who otherwise commits an act in 
furtherance of bribery while physically present in the United States or a 
United States territory.105
The more potent of the two affirmative defenses available under the 
FCPA places reasonable hospitality and promotional expenditures outside 
the ambit of “bribes” considered to violate the FCPA.  This includes 
 
the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that [is] . . . a 
reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and lodging 
expenses, incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official, . . . and was 
directly related to . . . the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of 
 
 100. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8).  The FCPA defines an issuer as 
any person who issues or proposes to issue any security; except that with respect to 
certificates of deposit for securities, voting-trust certificates, or collateral-trust 
certificates, or with respect to certificates of interest or shares in an unincorporated 
investment trust not having a board of directors or of the fixed, restricted 
management, or unit type, the term “issuer” means the person or persons 
performing the acts and assuming the duties of depositor or manager pursuant to 
the provisions of the trust or other agreement or instrument under which such 
securities are issued; and except that with respect to equipment-trust certificates or 
like securities, the term “issuer” means the person by whom the equipment or 
property is, or is to be, used. 
Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)–(B) (describing the record-keeping and internal 
control responsibilities of an issuer).  It is worth noting that “[a]s a practical matter, the 
books and records and internal control provisions apply only to publicly-held companies 
with shares traded on a U.S. exchange—a category which can include numerous foreign 
companies with shares traded on a U.S. exchange.” Koehler, supra note 97, at 922 (citing 
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Resolves Probe Against Oil Company that Bribed 
Iranian Official (Oct. 13, 2006), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2006/October/
06_crm_700.html).  
 101. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A). 
 102. See id. § 78m(b)(2)(B). 
 103. Id. § 78c(a)(8). 
 104. Id. § 78dd-2(h)(1). 
 105. Id. § 78dd-3.  The Government has argued that presence in the United States is 
sufficiently established by e-mails, telephone calls, and transfers through correspondent bank 
accounts in U.S. intermediary banks. See Adler v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 219 F.3d 
869, 875–76  (9th Cir. 2000) (“We have little trouble identifying a direct effect in the United 
States caused by the defendants’ acts.  Adler used the United States mails and telephones to 
commit bribery in violation of the FCPA as an ‘immediate consequence’ of the defendants’ 
acts.”); United States v. Bodmer, 342 F. Supp. 2d 176, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  For similar 
jurisdictional claims by the government, see also United States v. Turner, 624 F. Supp. 2d 
206, 226–230 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Zurich Capital Mkts., Inc. v. Coglianese, 388 F. Supp. 2d 
847, 858–59, 866–67 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
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products or services; . . . or the execution or performance of a contract 
with a foreign government or agency thereof.106
Hospitality and promotional expenditures that may fall within the scope 
of this affirmative defense include:  (1) the cost of the foreign official’s 
airfare to the United States,
 
107 (2) seminar fees,108 (3) meals,109 (4) 
reasonable lodging,110 (5) ground transportation,111 (6) product samples 
(presumably of minimal value),112 (7) entertainment,113 (8) FCPA-
avoidance training for foreign directors of an overseas business partner,114 
(9) certain domestic expenses related to a six-week internship program,115 
and (10) costs related to an “educational and promotional tour” of United 
States facilities.116
The second of the two affirmative defenses under the FCPA immunizes 
bribery that would otherwise be prohibited but for its legalization in the 
country in which the bribe was made.
 
117  This affirmative defense does not 
cover bribes paid in countries where such corruption is merely customary; 
rather, it requires that “the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of 
value” be “lawful under the written laws” of the bribe recipient’s 
country.118  Critics claim, however, that this affirmative defense offers 
nothing more than a “hollow” Hail Mary,119 because the large majority of 
countries where corruption is prevalent and bribery customary nevertheless 
outlaw the practice.  Moreover, the defense has been rejected at least once 
in federal court.120
Often referred to as “grease” payments, the FCPA provides a single 
exception for bribe-like payments to foreign officials, “the purpose of 
which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmental 
 
 
 106. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2), 78dd-2(c)(2). 
 107. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FCPA REVIEW PROCEDURE RELEASE No. 85-01 (1985). 
 108. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FCPA REVIEW PROCEDURE RELEASE No. 92-01 (1992). 
 109. See, e.g., id. 
 110. See, e.g., id. 
 111. See, e.g., id. 
 112. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FCPA REVIEW PROCEDURE RELEASE No. 82-01 (1982). 
 113. See, e.g., id. 
 114. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FCPA OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE No. 93-01 (1993). 
 115. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FCPA OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE No. 07-02 (2007). 
 116. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FCPA OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE No. 07-01 (2007). 
 117. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(1) (2006). 
 118. Id. §§ 78dd-1(c)(1), dd-2(c)(1), dd-3(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
 119. See Kyle Sheahen, I’m Not Going to Disneyland:  Illusory Affirmative Defenses 
Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 29 WIS. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2011), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1657675; cf. The Law Ain’t Broke, THE FCPA BLOG (Aug. 18, 
2010, 7:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2010/8/18/the-law-aint-broke.html (arguing 
that “[o]ne cannot deduce from the lack of successful uses of statutory defenses at trial the 
conclusion that those defenses are meaningless”). 
 120. See United States v. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 539–41 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(rejecting the defendant’s argument that his bribes were legal under foreign law because the 
bribe was disclosed, rendering the crime unprosecutable under the Azerbaijan Criminal 
Code). 
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action.”121
(i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a 
person to do business in a foreign country; (ii) processing governmental 
papers, such as visas and work orders; (iii) providing police protection, 
mail pick–up and delivery, or scheduling inspections associated with 
contract performance or inspections related to transit of goods across 
country; (iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading 
and unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities 
from deterioration; or (v) actions of a similar nature.
  The exception allows grease payments to be made for such 
routine governmental actions as 
122
This exception does not, however, cover payments related to 
discretionary decisions made by foreign officials such as whether to award 




F.  Sanctions 
 
Federal prosecutors have a wide array of weaponry with which to wage 
war on corruption.  The arsenal of criminal and civil penalties at the DOJ 
and SEC’s disposal in FCPA cases allows prosecutors to apply varying 
degrees of force to deter future violations and extract plea agreements for 
past violations.124  Penalties for violating the FCPA generally fall into one 
of two categories:  economic sanctions or imprisonment.125  When viewed 
through the lens of law and economics, “fines and imprisonment are simply 
different ways of imposing disutility on violators.”126  Under this view, 
“[c]ommercial bribery is a deliberate tort, and one way to deter it is to make 
it worthless to the tortfeasor by stripping away all his gain”127
1.  Criminal Sanctions 
 either by 
imposing sanctions on the tortfeasor that make the conduct too costly to 
engage in, or imprisoning corrupt individuals. 
Individuals criminally prosecuted under the FCPA for willfully bribing 
foreign officials face up to five years in prison and/or fines of up to 
$100,000 per violation.128
 
 121. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b), dd-2(b), dd-3(b). 
  Defendants face even stiffer penalties under the 
 122. Id. §§ 78dd-1(f)(3)(A), dd-2(h)(4)(A), dd-3(f)(4)(A). 
 123. See Eric Engle, I Get By with a Little Help from My Friends?  Understanding the 
U.K. Anti-bribery Statute, by Reference to the OECD Convention and the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 44 INT’L LAW. 1173, 1177 (2010); F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant, & 
Jill M. Pfenning, FCPA Compliance in China and the Gifts and Hospitality Challenge, 5 VA. 
L. & BUS. REV. 33, 63 (2010). 
 124. POSNER, supra note 14, at 220 (“[T]he criminal sanction ought to be calibrated to 
make the criminal worse off by committing the crime.”). 
 125. See Matthew Shabat, SEC Regulation of Attorneys Under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act:  Decisions on Efficiency and Their Role in International Anti-bribery Efforts, 
20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 987, 1000 (1999). 
 126. Id. at 223. 
 127. Williams Elecs. Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 366 F.3d 569, 576 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 128. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(2)(A), dd-3(e)(2)(A), 78ff(c)(2)(A) (2006). 
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FCPA’s accounting and record-keeping provisions, including up to twenty 
years in prison and/or fines not to exceed $5 million.129
As business shifts to various emerging foreign markets, prosecutors have 
increasingly relied on the threat of imprisonment to deter corporate 
executives from engaging in corrupt practices overseas.
 
130  This is due in 
large part to the failure of civil remedies during the 2000s to deter corporate 
greed and corruption domestically, which ultimately led to the collapse of 
Enron in 2001 and the banking industry in 2008.131  Prior to 1994, there 
were no incarcerations for violations of the FCPA.132  Following the 
financial scandals that exposed corporate corruption in the United States, 
incarcerating individuals tendering bribes abroad became rather 
common.133  Consequently, “[s]ome deterrent effect on corporate 
misconduct seems to exist now as a result of the recent ‘spectacle of 
executives being handcuffed and hauled off to jail.’”134
All sanctions result in some cost to the government that imposes them.  
Imprisonment involves the cost of facilities, guards, feeding and clothing 
the inmates, etc.; imposing fines involves other costs, like the efforts to 




When sanctioning entities rather than individuals, organizations charged 
with criminal violation of the antibribery provisions may face fines of up to 
$2 million per violation.
  Imprisonment in the white collar context (usually in nicer 
facilities) would seem to be especially costly for the government, making 
such a sanction even less appealing when compared to hefty fines and 
disgorgement for white collar offenses.  Of course, debarment imposes 
significant short-term costs on the government as well—perhaps losing a 
favorite contractor or vendor—but the benefits debarment offers help offset 
these costs in the long term. 
136
 
 129. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a). 
  Moreover, an entity’s criminal violation of the 
 130. Mendelsohn Says Criminal Bribery Prosecutions Doubled in 2007, 22 CORP. CRIME 
REP. 3 (2008) (“‘The number of individual prosecutions has risen—and that’s not an 
accident,’ Mendelsohn said.  ‘That is quite intentional on the part of the Department.  It is 
our view that to have a credible deterrent effect, people have to go to jail.’”). 
 131. See generally Nicholas J. Wagoner, Comment, Honest-Services Fraud:  The 
Supreme Court Defuses the Government’s Weapon of Mass Discretion in Skilling v. United 
States, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 1087, 1131–32 (2010) (“A more recent trend, which emerged 
during the 2000s, involved the endless string of highly publicized corporate scandals.  Most 
notably, scandals involving Enron, WorldCom, Martha Stewart, options backdating, lobbyist 
Jack Abramoff, the mortgage crisis and subsequent bailout, Bernie Madoff, and Goldman 
Sachs each left their mark on what Time Magazine characterized as the ‘Decade from 
Hell.’”). 
 132. STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW 
INTERNATIONAL NORMS 81 (2d ed. 2010). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Kathleen A. Lacey et al., Assessing the Deterrent Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s 
Certification Provisions:  A Comparative Analysis Using the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 397, 435 (2005) (quoting Jonathan Peterson, Corporate Fraud 
Cases Decline, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2004, at C1). 
 135. POSNER, supra note 14, at 223. 
 136. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(A), dd-3(e)(1)(A); 78ff(c)(1)(A)–(2)(A) (2006). 
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FCPA’s accounting and record-keeping provisions can lead to a fine of up 
to $25 million.137
2.  Civil Sanctions 
 
The DOJ has the power to pursue civil penalties for FCPA violations as 
well.  Civil actions provide the government with the benefit of a lower 
burden of proof, and penalties that have somewhat fewer legal restrictions 
than do fines.  Nevertheless, the DOJ has traditionally deferred to the SEC 
on civil matters.138  The discretion given to SEC officials to determine the 
nature of its enforcement action, the type of redress it will seek, and the 
severity of sanctions it will impose rivals that of the DOJ.139  As one might 
expect, the civil fine settlements obtained by the SEC in disgorgement and 
penalties appear to be close to the fine figures reported by the DOJ in 
criminal cases.140
3.  U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
 
The penalty imposed on a given company for engaging in foreign 
corruption is usually the product of a complex matrix of provisions in the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (USSG), which formulates a “corporate 
sentencing calculus” for prosecutors and courts.141  This formula is neither 
rigid nor precise;142 rather, it calls for the balancing of a variety of factors 
in determining the severity of the sentence.143
 
 137. Id. § 78ff(a). 
  First, the sentencing 
 138. See DEMING, supra note 132, at 75.  There are, however, a few instances in which 
the DOJ has pursued FCPA violations civilly. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., 
DIRECTORATE FOR FIN., FISCAL & ENTER. AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES:  PHASE 2, REPORT ON 
APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING 
BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 50 (2002), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/19/1962084.pdf (finding only four cases between 1979–
2002 where the DOJ brought a civil action under the FCPA). 
 139. See Weiss, supra note 30, at 478 (“[T]he SEC retains a great deal of discretion in 
deciding which civil enforcement actions to bring against issuers as well as the appropriate 
type of penalties—fines, injunctions, or both—to seek in an action.”). 
 140. Robert W. Tarun & Peter P. Tomczak, Introductory Essay, A Proposal for a United 
States Department of Justice Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Leniency Policy, 47 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 153, 165–66 (2010).  SEC officials tasked with prosecuting foreign corruption 
consider the following factors: 
egregiousness of conduct, isolated or systemic nature of violations; widespread or 
systemic nature of conduct; degree of self-policing; remedial efforts; and the 
extent of cooperation with investigation.  Additional factors include the degree of 
benefit to the company and the harm to others; the level of intent; the need for 
deterrence; and whether conduct was difficult to detect. 
RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES, QUESTIONS CONCERNING PHASE 3, supra note 5, at 32. 
 141. See Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 140, at 161–62. 
 142. See generally United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (holding that sentencing 
ranges must be advisory in nature rather than mandatory, preserving federal judges’ 
sentencing discretion). 
 143. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2C1.1, 2B1.1 (2010).  Although fines 
generally must fall within the range calculated under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 
deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements give prosecutors the 
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guidelines require a “base fine,”144 which, in the case of international 
corporate crimes, will most likely be “the pecuniary loss from the offense 
caused by the organization, to the extent the loss was caused intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly.”145
Second, a culpability score must be calculated
 
146 based on factors such as 
the extent to which upper level management condoned corrupt behavior, 
whether the prosecuted entity has a track record of corruption, whether the 
entity helped or hindered the investigation into its corrupt dealings, and the 
adequacy of the entity’s compliance program.147  Third, a culpability range 
must be determined by taking the culpability score calculated in the first 
two steps and cross-referencing it with the table at USSG section 8C2.6 to 
determine the minimum and maximum multiplier.148  The fine floor and 
fine ceiling create a range to help the court determine the appropriate fine.  
These calculated penalties are rarely imposed, however, as prosecutors 
typically enter into plea agreements with the prosecuted entities before 
turning the decision over to a sentencing judge.149
4.  Alternative Fines Act 
 
Prosecutors may strap additional penalties onto the fines calculated under 
the federal sentencing guidelines for FCPA violations, which frequently, “in 
aggregate, exceed the statutory maximums.”150  In theory, by increasing the 
severity of possible fines under the FCPA, prosecutors similarly enhance 
the deterrent force of the law.  Under the Alternative Fines Act (AFA), an 
entity may be fined up to twice the gross gain resulting from its corrupt 
practices.151  Conversely, when a prosecuted entity’s corruption results in 
pecuniary loss to a third party (e.g., where a defendant procures a contract 
in exchange for bribes, which would have otherwise been granted to a 
competitor), the contractor may face fines of up to twice the gross amount 
of the loss.152  Similarly, individuals may similarly face additional fines of 
up to $250,000, or up to twice the gross gain or loss under the AFA.153
 
discretion to seek fines “below the bottom of the guidelines range to reflect voluntary 
reporting, extensive internal investigation, cooperation, remediation, and similar mitigating 




 144. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.4(a). 
 145. Id. § 8C2.4(a)(3). 
 146. See JULIE O’SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME 210 (3d ed. 2007). 
 147. See U.S.S.G. §§ 8B2.1(b)(1)–(7), 8C2.5(b)–(e), 8C2.5(f)(1); see also Tarun & 
Tomczak, supra note 140, at 162 (citing U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(b)–(e)). 
 148. See O’SULLIVAN, supra note 146, at 213. 
 149. Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 140, at 165. 
 150. Id. at 161. 
 151. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(a), 3571(d) (2006). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. § 3571(b), 3571(d). 
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5.  Confiscation of Bribery and Proceeds of Bribery 
a.  Civil Disgorgement 
The government tries to mulct the accrued benefits of bribery either 
through criminal forfeiture (DOJ) or civil disgorgement of profits (SEC).154  
The SEC has increasingly sought to disgorge profits from companies that 
obtained them by corrupt means.155  Commentators have questioned the 
SEC’s disgorgement authority156 because the relevant statute does not 
expressly authorize this penalty, nor is there support in the FCPA’s 
legislative history,157 and courts have not yet had the opportunity to review 
it.158  Critics of disgorgement argue that, although the penalty theoretically 
“can provide perfect deterrence by depriving corporations of the entirety of 
the incentive for engaging in illegal bribing,” this is “not necessarily [what 
occurs] in practice”159
b.  Civil Forfeiture 
 given the costly, time-consuming, and politically 
delicate nature of following the money trail of profits stashed away in banks 
across the world. 
The DOJ and SEC have several means by which they may force 
companies to forfeit assets linked to the investigation or prosecution of 
foreign corruption.  For instance, under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform 
Act of 2000,160 any offense listed as an “unlawful activity” in the Money 
Laundering Control Act,161 which includes FCPA violations, may be civilly 
forfeited.162  Similarly, although it rarely exercises its authority to do so, 
the DOJ may seize the assets of a company under investigation for foreign 
corruption.163  It has done so on at least two occasions in recent years.164
6.  Prohibition from Participating in Public Contracts/Advantages 
 
When deciding which federal contractors to retain, federal agencies must 
conduct extensive audits to determine whether a potential private sector 
 
 154. RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES, QUESTIONS CONCERNING PHASE 3, supra note 5, at 
33.  
 155. See Weiss, supra note 30, at 478.  Furthermore, “[t]he SEC will often follow a ‘zero 
tolerance’ policy in the case of companies that violate both the bribery and record-keeping 
provisions, but it has shown more willingness to work with companies that implement 
prompt and effective remedial measures.” Id. 
 156. See e.g., id. at 486, 497; see also Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 140, at 165–66. 
 157. See James R. Doty, Toward a Reg. FCPA:  A Modest Proposal for Change in 
Administering the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62 BUS. LAW. 1233, 1237–38 (2007). 
 158. Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 140, at 166. 
 159. Weiss, supra note 30, at 506. 
 160. 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2006). 
 161. Id. § 1957. 
 162. See DEMING, supra note 132, at 82. 
 163. RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES, QUESTIONS CONCERNING PHASE 3, supra note 5, at 
33.  
 164. See id. at 18. 
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partner will likely comply with foreign corruption laws like the FCPA.165  
Companies must have “appropriate internal controls” in order to qualify for 
public contracts.166  Federal contractors can face suspension or debarment 
for knowingly withholding disclosure to the government of other contracts 
it obtained via “fraud, conflict of interest, bribery, or gratuity violations.”167
II.  BAE SYSTEMS:  A CASE STUDY OF CORRUPTION 
 
The unlikely facts that ultimately led to the prosecution of BAE began to 
unfold more than twenty years ago, when Saudi Arabia, a vital ally to the 
Western world’s fight against terrorism in the Middle East, placed an order 
for approximately 125 Tornado fighter jets manufactured by BAE.  With 
approximately 100,000 employees serving more than 100 countries,168 
BAE Systems is the second largest global defense company.169  In 2010 
alone, it reported sales of over £22.4 billion.170
Whispers of corruption swirled around the deal from day one.  There 
were rumors that BAE agents handed wads of cash to Saudi representatives, 
and of extravagant “gifts” like a mansion in the United States and a 
personal Airbus 340
  With enough capacity and 
firepower to meet the Royal Saudi Air Force’s needs, BAE seemed like an 
obvious choice for the “Al-Yamamah” arms deal. 
171 in pursuing the Saudi arms contract.  To conceal the 
illicit expenses, accountants at BAE invoiced them using cryptic language 
such as “support services.”172
The allegations of bribery ultimately prompted the prosecuting arm of the 
United Kingdom, the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), to begin investigating 
BAE in 2006.  The SFO suspected that BAE had used shell companies to 




 165. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR 
A-133, AUDITS OF STATES, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, AND NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (rev. 
2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/
a133/a133_revised_2007.pdf. 
  When the 
Saudi prince who was brokering the deal learned of the investigation, he 
threatened to take the Al-Yamamah deal to a competing country if the 
 166. RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES, QUESTIONS CONCERNING PHASE 3, supra note 5, at 
45. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Key Facts, BAESYSTEMS.COM, http://www.baesystems.com/AboutUs/FactSheet/
index.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
 169. Defense News Top 100 for 2009, DEFENSE NEWS (June 28, 2010) 
http://defensenews.com/static/features/top100/charts/rank_2009.php?c=FEA&s=T1C (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
 170. Key Facts, supra note 168. 
 171. R v. Director of the Serious Fraud Office, [2008] EWHC (Admin) 714, 2008 WL 
833707, [8]-[38] (Divisional Court’s Judgment); see also R v. Director of the Serious Fraud 
Office, [2008] UKHL 60; Interview with David Leigh, Frontline:  Black Money, PBS (Sept. 
13, 2008), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/blackmoney/interviews/leigh.html. 
 172. Complaint at ¶ 43, United States v. BAE Sys., No. 1:10-cr-00035-JDB (D.D.C. Feb. 
4, 2010). 
 173. See Ashish S. Joshi, Britain’s Fight Against the “Silver Lance”:  A Radical 
Overhaul of the U.K.’s Bribery Law, 33 CHAMPION 36, 37 (2009). 
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investigation continued.174  When this did not work, Saudi officials and 
their political allies pressured the director of the SFO with threats of cutting 
off the steady stream of military intelligence it was supplying to the U.K., 
placing “British lives on British streets . . . at risk.”175
London’s 7/7 bombings were still fresh in people’s memories when 
Prime Minister Tony Blair convinced the SFO to drop its investigation of 
BAE, citing concerns for national security.
 
176  Following this 
announcement, the U.K. “won” a contract from the Saudi Arabian 
government for seventy-two Typhoon jet fighters worth $8 billion.177
[L]et me make one thing very clear to you—I don’t believe the 
investigation, incidentally, would have led anywhere except to the 
complete wreckage of a vital strategic relationship for our country in 
terms of fighting terrorism, in terms of the Middle East, in terms of 
British interests there, quite apart from the fact that we would have lost 
thousands, thousands of British jobs.
  
When questioned at the G8 Summit about his decision to suspend the 
investigation of BAE, Prime Minister Blair asserted: 
178




But BAE’s troubles were not over.  When its CEO’s plane touched down 
in Houston, Texas on May 13, 2008, federal agents were there to greet him.  
In the two years that followed, federal officials unraveled a global network 
of bribes and kickbacks, which BAE fed with its multi-million dollar slush 
fund that helped it pay off the highest echelons of governments in return for 
defense contracts.  In February 2010, the DOJ informed the court that it had 
discovered that “BAE provided substantial benefits to one [Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia] public official, who was in a position of influence regarding 
the KSA Fighter Deals.”
 
180
In court filings, the DOJ describes BAE’s marketing strategy, in which it 
used intermediaries to “purchase . . . travel and accommodations, security 
services, real estate, automobiles and personal items”
 
181 as they courted 
Saudi officials who held the purse strings to the Al-Yamamah contract.  A 
travel agent involved would later explain the lavish lifestyles that BAE 
afforded Saudi officials as being one “beyond that of a film star, because 
[they have] the diplomatic passport.”182
 
 174. Id. at 37. 
 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See Sue Reisinger, Mission Critical, CORP. COUNSEL, Dec. 2008, at 90. 
 178. Transcript, Frontline:  Black Money, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/blackmoney/etc/script.html (transcript of PBS television broadcast of Apr. 7, 2009). 
 179. See id. (quoting the Prince as suggesting that a degree of corruption was acceptable 
for the development of Saudi Arabia and asserting, “We did not invent corruption.  This has 
happened since . . . Adam and Eve . . . .  [T]his is human nature.”). 
 180. Complaint at ¶ 43, United States v. BAE Sys., No. 1:10-cr-00035 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 
2010). 
 181. Id. at ¶ 44. 
 182. Transcript, supra note 178. 
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The factual description and charging language used by the government to 
describe BAE’s illicit activity “is frequently used by the DOJ in charging 
companies with FCPA violations.”183  Despite the seeming applicability of 
the FCPA’s antibribery and reporting provisions, the DOJ instead charged 
BAE with conspiracy to make false statements to the United States 
government about the nature of its payments—a charge that, unlike the 
FCPA, does not trigger an agency’s discretionary debarment authority.184  
The United States was able to assert jurisdiction over the British company 
because BAE facilitated its crooked operations abroad through agents 
working within the borders of the United States.185
A month later, the DOJ announced BAE’s guilty plea to “mak[ing] false 
statements about its [FCPA] compliance program,” in which it agreed to 
pay a $400 million criminal fine.
 
186  Though the fine was touted as “one of 
the largest criminal fines in the history of DOJ’s ongoing effort to combat 
overseas corruption,”187 the absence of an FCPA charge meant that 
debarment was not an option.  The government officials nevertheless took 
the opportunity to reaffirm their stated commitment to “hold[ing] 
accountable companies that impair the operations of the United States 
government by lying about their conduct and operations.”188  The Assistant 
Director of the FBI’s Washington Field Office echoed these concerns:  
“Corporations and individuals who conspire to defeat this basic economic 
principle not only cause harm but ultimately shake the public’s confidence 
in the entire system.”189
It appears, however, that the government’s desire to avoid the 
inconvenience that would result from an FCPA-related debarment (namely, 
having to hire a new contractor) outweighs its concern for maintaining the 




 183. Koehler, supra note 
  BAE’s indispensible 
97, at 995. 
 184. Complaint at ¶ 5, United States v. BAE Sys., No. 1:10-cr-00035 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 
2010).  The United States alleged that 
[f]rom at least in or about 2000, BAE Systems plc knowingly and willfully 
conspired, and agreed, with others known and unknown to the United States, to:  
(a) knowingly and willfully impede and impair the lawful government functions of 
the United States government, . . . by making certain false, inaccurate and 
incomplete statements to the U.S. government . . . thereby defrauding the United 
States in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371; and (b) . . . 
knowingly and willfully make materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements 
or representations; in violation of Title 18, United State Code, Section 1001. 
Id.  According to the government, the fruits of BAE’s illicit payments included “gains” in 
excess of $200 million. Id. ¶ 48. 
 185. Id. ¶ 44. 
 186. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to 
Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/
March/10-crm-209.html. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. (statement by Acting Deputy Att’y Gen. Gary G. Grindler). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Sentencing Memorandum at 11, United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, No. 
1:08-cr-00367 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008).  In declining to bring anti-bribery charges against 
Siemens, prosecutors cited “[t]he Department’s analysis of collateral consequences [which] 
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partnership with American agencies as the “fifth largest provider of defense 
materials to the United States government”191
If companies in which “bribery was nothing less than standard operating 
procedure”
 may have helped it dodge a 
bullet. 
192
As pointed out by Professor Mike Koehler, the FCPA’s ability to 
accomplish its stated goal—to deter foreign corruption—is severely 
diminished when the message sent by prosecutors in cases like BAE “is that 
certain companies in certain industries, particularly those that sell certain 
products to certain customers, are essentially immune from FCPA.”
 continue to receive preferential treatment because of 
partnerships with key United States officials, the deterrent effect of holding 
accountable companies that spread lies and corruption across the globe is 
stripped away.  When companies weigh the benefits against the costs 
associated with paying bribes to receive contracts abroad, the government’s 
refusal to bring FCPA charges in cases like BAE places a heavy thumb on 
the benefits side of the scale.  This becomes even more concerning when 
the government actually endorses these practices through continued 
partnership with untrustworthy contractors that take money out of the 
pocket of the American taxpayer and inject it into the foreign market for 
black money. 
193
Roughly a year after the FBI and DOJ had uncovered BAE’s lies and 
corruption, the United States entered into no fewer than 13,000 contracts 
and subcontracts with BAE totaling upwards of $6 billion.
  
Perhaps most concerning, however, is the United States’ continued 
partnership with companies that recently admitted to engaging in foreign 
corruption.  In categorically refusing to seriously consider suspending or 
debarring companies that undermine confidence in free markets overseas, 
our nation risks eroding the public’s trust in government institutions at 
home. 
194
Perhaps even more shocking than the staggering sums of United States 
tax dollars shelled out to BAE after the company admitted to bribery and 
fraud are the government entities that may be bankrolling such foreign 
corruption.  For example, just seven months after the FBI lambasted BAE 
  When 
compared side by side, this $6 billion promised to BAE in the year that 
followed its guilty plea makes the $400 million fine imposed on it look less 
like a serious effort to root out corruption, and more like a cost of doing 
business. 
 
included the consideration of the risk of debarment and exclusion from government 
contracts” as influencing its decision not to charge Siemens under the FCPA. Id. 
 191. Sentencing Memorandum at 1, United States v. BAE Sys., No. 1:10-cr-00035 
(D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2010). 
 192. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined 
Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-
1105.html. 
 193. Koehler, supra note 97, at 996. 
 194. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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for its crooked business practices,195 the FBI entrusted BAE with a $40 
million contract to “provide critical information security safeguards . . . to 
ensure the confidentiality and privacy of FBI computer networks in the 
United States and around the world.”196  One need not understand the 
intricacies of law and economics to grasp how the FBI’s decision to invite 
BAE to serve as the “gatekeeper” for the FBI “in the cyber world”197
III.  DEBARMENT AS A METHOD OF DETERRING FOREIGN CORRUPTION 
 sends 
the exact opposite message about the government’s tolerance for foreign 
corruption. 
A.  The Fallacy of Corporate Fines as a Deterrent 
Prosecutors at the DOJ and SEC frequently boast of the massive fines 
imposed on companies that violate the FCPA as a sign of success.198  
Similarly, scholars often point to the increasingly large FCPA-related fines 
imposed on companies as evidence of the Act’s “resurgence.”199
Despite this seemingly singular focus on corporate sanctions, fines offer 
little deterrent value in the corporate setting, and in some cases actually 
work against the FCPA’s goal of deterring foreign corruption.  Fines 
provide an ineffective mechanism for deterring white collar crime 
committed by corporations because corporations, in essence, have “no soul 
to damn [and] no body to kick.”
  Almost 
no attention has been given to the deterrent capability of alternative forms 
of punishment, however, such as suspension and debarment. 
200
1.  Corruption as a Cost of Doing Business 
 
The first popular fallacy is that the threat of a hefty fine deters 
corporations from engaging in misconduct much in the same manner as it 
would a person.  This misses the reality that corporations are nothing more 
than a legal fiction; humans, on the other hand, are living, breathing, 
feeling, and thinking beings.  Whereas a human may experience the painful, 
agonizing toll that steep fines have on their quality of life, corporations 
cannot be coerced in this manner.  Moreover, “deterrence via corporate 
sanctions does not halt the individual behaviors of agents and officers 
 
 195. See supra note 189. 
 196. Press Release, BAE Sys., BAE Systems to Provide Cyber Security to FBI in $40 
Million Order (Sept. 21, 2010), http://www.baesystems.com/Newsroom/NewsReleases/
2010/autoGen_11082113586.html. 
 197. Id. (statement by BAE Systems’ Vice President and General Manager of Intelligence 
and Security Tom Sechler). 
 198. See, e.g., Breuer, supra note 25 (stating that the DOJ has “imposed the most criminal 
penalties in FCPA-related cases in any single 12-month period—ever.  Well over $1 
billion.”). 
 199. See generally Koehler, supra note 58. 
 200. See generally John Coffee, “No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick”:  An 
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 
(1981). 
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within the corporation, who feel peer pressure for profits or sales results 
that is greater than their expected norm of ethical and compliant 
behavior.”201
As rational calculators of costs and benefits, “a corporation might employ 
a simple cost-benefit analysis in whether to engage in bribery and merely 
suffer a large fine.”
 
202  When viewed from a law and economics 
perspective, it is not surprising that less than a decade after its enactment, 
debate in Congress centered on whether sanctions for violating the FCPA 
would merely be treated as a “cost of doing business.”203
Under this critique, FCPA fines have little if any deterrent effect when 
the benefits derived from the sanctionable conduct—landing massive 
overseas contracts by paying off foreign officials without risking the loss of 
equally profitable business with the United States—largely outweigh the 
cost of getting caught.  As one author observed,  
 
Even if it makes sense to threaten profits, legal sanctions have to be 
sensitive to the fact that, comparatively, they are of very little significance 
to a large corporation.  Profits can be increased or undermined from many 
more sources:  through personnel policies, competitors’ moves, 
investment or not in production and so on.204
As a result, the question for corporate actors is not “To bribe or not to 
bribe?” but rather “How much could this bribe cost the company?”  
Unfortunately, fines present a corporation with the opportunity to pay its 
way out of an FCPA violation. 
   
2.  Mixed Messages Sent by Monetary Sanctions 
That FCPA-related fines are perceived merely as costs of doing business 
rather than punishment for morally repugnant corruption undermines the 
moral message embodied in the legislation.  This in turn “undercuts the 
[FCPA’s] deterrent force.”205
 
 201. JAMES T. O’REILLY ET AL., PUNISHING CORPORATE CRIMES:  LEGAL PENALTIES FOR 
CRIMINAL AND REGULATORY VIOLATIONS 14 (2009) (citing generally Coffee, supra note 
  In his book Punishment and Modern Society:  
A Study in Social Theory, David Garland explains how “penality 
communicates meaning not just about crime and punishment but also about 
power, authority, legitimacy, normality, morality, personhood, social 
200). 
 202. Thomas, supra note 16, at 467. 
 203. Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act:  Joint Hearing on S. 430 
Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Fin. & Monetary Policy and the Subcomm. on Sec. of the 
Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 99th Cong. 2 (1986) (response of John C. 
Keeney, Deputy Att’y Gen., Criminal Div., DOJ, to written questions of Sen. D’Amato) . 
 204. CELIA WELLS, CORPORATIONS AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 34 (2d ed. 2001).  
 205. See Eliason Says Shift to Deferred Prosecution Agreements Unduly Favors 
Corporations, 22 CORP. CRIME REP. 1 (2008); see also Brent Fisse, Reconstructing 
Corporate Criminal Law:  Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1141, 1217 (1983) (“Another inadequacy of fines is that they convey the impression that 
permission to commit a crime may be bought for a price.  This impression conflicts with the 
goals of both deterrence and retribution, which are partly to express the notion that offenses 
are socially unwanted and that money alone cannot adequately compensate.”). 
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relations, and a host of other tangential matters.”206  Thus, “[f]ines do not 
emphatically convey the message that serious corporate offenses are 
socially intolerable.  Rather they create the impression that corporate crime 
is permissible provided the offender merely pays the going price.”207
By tolerating contractors’ corruption through continued patronage, 
domestic agencies send the message to contractors that paying bribes and 
falsifying reports is an excusable offense so long as a company that gets 
caught “can buy [its] way out of criminal liability.”
 
208  When those who get 
caught are making exponentially greater sums of money from government 
contracts, including United States contracts, the risk of getting caught 
tendering a bribe overseas (especially when discounted by the low 
probability of detection) becomes significantly diminished.  Moreover, with 
the flow of new United States contracts on a regular basis, “[P]aying of 
bribes . . . will not [be] tolerated”209
conflicts with the goals of both deterrence and retribution, which are 
partly to express the notion that offenses are socially unwanted and that 
money alone cannot adequately compensate.  Whatever compensation 
victims receive after a harm has occurred, in many cases they would have 
been unwilling to prebargain for the harm in return for monetary 
compensation.
 becomes, “Don’t worry about it, we’ll 
deduct it from your next paycheck.”  This approach to FCPA enforcement 
210
3.  Abusive Monetary Sanctions 
 
Controversy surrounds the use of sanctions to punish companies for 
unethical behavior, due to the potential for inviting prosecutorial abuse.  
Prosecutorial abuse through monetary sanctions in the FCPA context 
typically takes one of two forms.  First, critics contend that prosecutors 
threaten companies with massive unwarranted fines to coerce them into plea 
agreements.211  Other critics take this concern a step further by pointing out 
that threats of large fines have helped extract plea agreements even in cases 
where the government’s legal theories were questionable.212
 
 206. DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY:  A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY 
252 (1990). 
  The massive 
 207. Brent Fisse, Sentencing Options Against Corporations, 1 CRIM. L.F. 211, 220 
(1990); see also WELLS, supra note 204, at 31 (“It is interesting that the word ‘punishment’ 
is replaced when corporations are the object of criminal enforcement by the altogether less 
emotive ‘sanction.’”). 
 208. Eliason Says Shift to Deferred Prosecution Agreements Unduly Favors 
Corporations, supra note 205, at 3; see also Fisse, supra note 205, at 1217 (“Another 
inadequacy of fines is that they convey the impression that permission to commit a crime 
may be bought for a price.”). 
 209. Breuer, supra note 43.  
 210. Fisse, supra note 205, at 1217. 
 211. See, e.g., DEMING, supra note 132, at 77 (“Given the severity of the criminal penalty 
for a violation of the accounting and record-keeping provisions, and a greater ability to prove 
a violation, a prosecutor has an enhanced ability to negotiate a plea.”). 
 212. See Koehler, supra note 97, at 946–55. 
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fines and disgorgement of profits imposed under the FCPA may stand on 
similarly shaky ground.213
As discussed throughout this Article, although suspension or debarment 
can be far more crippling to a company’s bottom line than the imposition of 
a fine, debarment offers an alternative to fines that is less susceptible to 
abuse.  Settlements or plea bargains usually fall within prosecutorial 
discretion,
 
214 even in corruption cases.  If a corporate defendant is risk-
averse, officials can use the threat of large fines to induce the firms into 
plea bargaining even where the evidence of corruption is relatively thin.  As 
with other sanctions, suspension and debarment are within the discretion of 
the enforcement agencies, so these punishments can become part of the 
threats used in plea bargaining with suspected violators.215
Second, some claim that the typical FCPA-related penalties imposed on 
companies facilitate prosecutorial cronyism.  Those who endorse this 
perspective claim that a look behind the curtain reveals “Bribery Inc.,” in 
which a booming industry exists that largely benefits ex-prosecutors who 
parlay their DOJ contacts into lucrative gigs as DOJ-appointed monitors 
and compliance officers at private corporations under investigation for 
foreign corruption.  Critics point to the fact that the majority of these 
monitors are former DOJ prosecutors.
 
216
Given the DOJ’s and SEC’s practically unfettered discretion over the 
terms of a company’s plea agreement, federal prosecutors may engage in 
political patronage by levying massive fines and monitoring fees on a 
company, requiring legal fees “to the tune of billions of dollars,” which 
trickle down to lawyers, “many with past ties to the U.S. Justice 
Department.”
 
217  The argument continues, “[T]here is nothing to stop 
prosecutors from ginning up cases that will feed the lawyers who used to 
have their jobs or from looking forward to a payday in the private sector 
that will be made possible by their busy successors at Justice.”218  
Expressing her “outrage, that people get $50 million to be a monitor,” U.S. 
District Court Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle declared the fines, fees, and other 
expenses generated by FCPA-related monetary sanctions as having created 
a “boondoggle.”219
 
 213. See id. at 963–84. 
 
 214. Ellen S. Podgor, The Tainted Federal Prosecutor in an Overcriminalized Justice 
System, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1569, 1569 (2010). 
 215. See FAR 9.406-1(a) (2010) (“It is the debarring official’s responsibility to determine 
whether debarment is in the Government’s interest.”).  
 216. See Vardi, supra note 37, at 2 (“It seems that an important qualification for these 
gigs is having previously worked at the Justice Department—as 7 of the 13 FCPA monitors 
have done.”). 
 217. Id. at 1. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Christopher Matthews, Judge Blasts Compliance Monitors at Innospec Plea 
Hearing, MAIN JUSTICE (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.mainjustice.com/justanticorruption/
2010/03/18/judge-blasts-compliance-monitors-at-innospec-plea-hearing/. 
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B.  The Law of Suspension and Debarment 
The Reagan Administration was the first major proponent of using 
debarment to deter “government waste, fraud, and exploitation of public 
funds in federal programs” and to enhance “governmental 
accountability.”220  Although companies are mandatorily debarred from 
contracting with the United States221 and European Union (EU)222 for 
violating certain statutes, 31 U.S.C. § 6101 leaves the decision up to each 
agency’s discretion when contractors violate the FCPA.223
Companies that solicit, procure, or carry out a government contract by 
paying bribes, making false statements, or destroying evidence—conduct 
that obviously falls within the purview of the FCPA’s antibribery and 
accounting provisions—trigger an agency’s discretionary debarment 
authority.
 
224  This power to suspend or debar federal contractors during 
criminal FCPA prosecution arises under the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR), which calls for a company’s suspension or debarment for up to three 
years, “commensurate with the seriousness of the cause(s).”225
When agency officials assess the seriousness of the cause, “the contractor 
has the burden of demonstrating, to the satisfaction of the debarring official, 
its present responsibility, and that debarment is not necessary.”
 
226  In 
reviewing suspension and debarment decisions, courts have similarly taken 
into consideration the “mitigating circumstances in order to sustain a 
debarment or suspension.”227
The resulting harm that may occur to a contractor following its 
suspension or debarment is magnified by the fact that such decisions are 




 220. See O’REILLY ET AL., supra note 
  In other 
words, each agency has the power to blacklist a contractor from conducting 
business with any other agency of the United States.  This is not without 
201, at 252 (citing Exec. Order No. 12549, 51 Fed. 
Reg. 6370 (Feb. 18, 1986) (applying debarment to abuses of federal “grants, cooperative 
agreements, contracts of assistance, loans, and loan guarantees,” but not “procurement 
programs”)).  In 1989, President George H.W. Bush subsequently expanded the utility of 
debarment by making an agency’s debarment of a company applicable to all agencies, 
government-wide. Executive Order 12689, 54 Fed. Reg. 34131 (Aug. 16, 1989). 
 221. See, e.g., Generic Drug Enforcement Act, 21 U.S.C. § 335a(a)(2)(B) (2006); Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 § 2, 22 U.S.C. § 3201 (2006); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1368 (2006); Davis Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a–277a-5 (2006); Buy American Act, 41 
U.S.C. §§ 10–10d (2006); Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 35–45; Service Contract Act of 
1965, 41 U.S.C. §§ 351–358; Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, 41 U.S.C. § 701; Clean Air 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7606 (2006). 
 222. Council Directive 2004/18/EC, art. 45, 2004 O.J. (L. 134/114), 120–21 (EU). 
 223. See 31 U.S.C. § 6101 (2006). 
 224. FAR 9.406-2(a) (2010). 
 225. Id. § 9.406-4. 
 226. Id. § 9.401-(a)(10). 
 227. W. NOEL KEYES, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS UNDER THE FEDERAL ACQUISITIONS ACT 
239 (3d ed. 2003) (compiling cases). 
 228. See FAR 52.212-5; see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FIGHTING GLOBAL CORRUPTION:  
BUSINESS RISK MANAGEMENT 28 (2001).  Significantly, a company that enters into a non-
prosecution agreement or deferred prosecution agreement under the FCPA is still subject to 
debarment. See Finder & McConnell, supra note 54, at 36. 
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exception, however, as agencies may still pursue business with a blacklisted 
contractor so long as the agency produces a written statement from the 
agency’s debarment official providing “the compelling reasons” for renewal 
or extension of its business with the contractor.229
C.  Suspension and Debarment as a “Corporate Death Sentence” 
 
Commentators have described the severity of a company’s preclusion 
from contracting with the government as being a “drastic penalty,”230 a 
“virtual ‘death sentence,’”231 and as effectively “sound[ing] the death 
knell”232 for many companies.  This is particularly true when a company’s 
bread and butter are bullets and bombs,233 healthcare,234 oil and gas, or any 
other industry heavily regulated by the United States.  Although the FAR’s 
purpose was to protect the government rather than punish criminal 
contractors,235 officials resort to it only for the most egregious criminal 
violations.236
D.  Benefits of Debarment 
 
1.  Increased Compliance Without Increased Enforcement Costs 
Given its potency as a penalty, “[f]or large defense contractors, 
disbarment from U.S. government contracts could well be the most 
significant deterrent to engaging in conduct proscribed under the FCPA.”237
 
 229. FAR 9.405-1(b). 
  
Thus, the heightened degree of severity associated with the risk of 
debarment, even when the risk of detection is minimal, will increase 
compliance with the FCPA.  Penalizing corrupt contractors by suspending 
federal funding would more effectively dry up the market for bribe money 
 230. O’REILLY ET AL., supra note 201, at 251. 
 231. Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-
Enron World:  The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 
1134 (2006); see also O’REILLY ET AL., supra note 201, at 256 (“The result is the corporate 
‘death penalty’ because the pipeline of new product approvals is closed for that entity or that 
person, and no further approvals can be made—effectively ending the ability of the company 
to remain in that regulated field.”). 
 232. Charles V. Weinograd, Note, Clarifying Grease:  Mitigating the Threat of 
Overdeterrence by Defining the Scope of the Routine Governmental Action Exception, 50 
VA. J. INT’L L. 509, 526 n.99 (2010). 
 233. See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text. 
 234. See Conry, supra note 60, at 1. 
 235. See O’REILLY ET AL., supra note 201, at 254. 
 236. See id. (“Debarment from contracting with the government is an exceptional 
remedy.”); see also FAR 9.406-4(a)(1) (2010) (“Debarment shall be for a period 
commensurate with the seriousness of the cause(s).”). 
 237. James C. Nobles, Jr. & Christina Maistrellis, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:  A 
Systematic Solution for the U.S. Multinational, L. & BUS. REV. AMS., Spring 1995, at 5, 11; 
see also J. Kelly Strader, White Collar Crime and Punishment:  Reflections on Michael, 
Martha, and Milberg Weiss, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45, 102 (2007) (“There is substantial 
evidence that white collar defendants are strongly deterred by civil/administrative sanctions, 
including debarment.”). 
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than mere fines, which merely become costs of doing business to firms that 
continue to make multiples more through subsequent government contracts. 
2.  Increased Self-Disclosure Without Increased Enforcement Costs 
Investigating foreign corruption can be time consuming and extremely 
expensive for the FBI, DOJ, and SEC.  With limited resources at their 
disposal, federal prosecutors encourage companies to disclose cases in 
which the company believes it may have violated the FCPA.  Doing so 
allows prosecutors to devote more of their time and energy towards 
prosecuting cases in which a suspected corporate wrongdoer has taken steps 
to conceal its corrupt practices.  Seeking to avoid this, the DOJ would likely 
suggest debarment in only those cases that eat up public resources due to 
prolonged discovery that could have been avoided through voluntary 
disclosure. 
To incentivize self-disclosure, the DOJ has promised that it will 
“meaningfully reward” voluntary disclosures with lesser penalties.238  The 
“reward” for voluntary disclosure is a lighter sentence.  Professor Koehler 
identifies a variety of means through which prosecutors entice companies to 
voluntarily disclose potential violations, which include a “corporation’s 
timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to 
cooperate in the investigation of its agents” as well as its “cooperat[ion] 
with the relevant government agencies.”239  He also notes that an important 
consideration in deciding to self-disclose “is that such a course of conduct 
is more efficient and certain compared to the DOJ independently finding 
out about the conduct (however slight the possibility) and harshly 
penalizing the company for failing to voluntarily disclose.”240
The relevant debarment provisions of FAR similarly call for agencies to 
consider leniency when (1) the company conducted a thorough internal 
investigation of the matter, (2) it reported the findings of its investigation to 
the government, (3) the agency believes the corrupt employee or employees 
were adequately disciplined, (4) measures were implemented to ensure 
future compliance with the FCPA, and (5) adequate deterrent measures 
were in place when the violation occurred.
  Given the 
dire results associated with debarment, the consequence of which is viewed 
by most companies as being more severe than being fined, companies will 
be even more inclined to dispose of such risk through voluntary disclosure. 
241
Seeking to curry favor with prosecutors and agencies, the heightened 
severity associated with suspension or debarment may compel a greater 
number of companies to self-disclose their corrupt dealings in hopes of 
 
 
 238. Breuer, supra note 43, at 5. 
 239. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-28.300 (2008) [hereinafter 
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations]; see also Koehler, supra note 
97, at 925. 
 240. Koehler, supra note 97, at 926. 
 241. FAR 9.406-1(a) (2010). 
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avoiding the FCPA’s harshest of penalties.242  By debarring companies in 
egregious, highly public cases of foreign corruption, federal prosecutors can 
leverage the escalated level of risk associated with debarment to incentivize 
more companies to come forward in exchange for leniency.243
E.  The Discretionary Debarment Decision 
 
Prosecutors exercise a significant degree of charging discretion.244
1.  Are Corrupt Government Contractors “Too Big to Debar”? 
  A 
prosecutor’s decision to pursue claims of bribery under the FCPA (thereby 
triggering an agency’s discretionary debarment power) rather than charging 
the contractor under an alternative applicable statute, directly affects 
whether the company is subject to mandatory debarment, discretionary 
debarment, or is altogether immune from the risk of suspension or 
debarment.  Prosecutors also indirectly influence debarment officials 
through frequent meetings and intra-agency cooperation. 
Although prosecutors exercise a significant degree of influence over an 
agency’s discretionary debarment decision as discussed above, the ultimate 
decision rests with the agencies that do business with corrupt contractors.  
In 1987 alone, the Department of Defense’s “total suspensions and 
debarments of contractors totaled 898,” which was “over three times the 
280 actions taken in fiscal year 1983.”245  Yet despite “[m]any of the U.S. 
government’s largest contractors hav[ing] been found to have repeatedly 
broken the law or engaged in misconduct” between 1990 and 2002, only 
one of the top forty-three government contractors was suspended or 
debarred during this period.246  These figures lend support to the Project on 
Government Oversight’s conclusion “that large contractors enjoy an unfair 
advantage over smaller contractors in navigating the federal government’s 
suspension and debarment system.”247
Admittedly, debarment differs from other FCPA sanctions in the 
collateral costs it imposes on the government, besides its particular burdens 
on the sanctioned violator.  Other agencies, which have no input in the 
decision about sanctioning FCPA violators, may have long running 
 
 
 242. See Wray & Hur, supra note 231, at 1115. 
 243. See, e.g., id. (“[The Department of Defense (DoD)] adopted a voluntary disclosure 
program that provides for the possibility of more lenient treatment for contractors that self-
report.  In order to encourage companies to self-report potential violations and agree to 
cooperate with the ensuing audits and investigations, DoD offers companies the increased 
likelihood of avoiding suspension and debarment—sanctions that are, for defense 
contractors, even more deathly than corporate criminal charges themselves.”). 
 244. See Wagoner, supra note 131, at 1108–12. 
 245. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-88-5BR, DOD FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS:  
CHARACTERISTICS, SANCTIONS, AND PREVENTION (1988). 
 246. Federal Contractor Misconduct:  Failures of the Suspension and Debarment System, 
POGO (May 10, 2002), http://www.pogo.org/pogo-files/reports/contract-oversight/federal-
contractor-misconduct/co-fcm-20020510.html.  The lone suspension lasted a mere five days. 
Id. 
 247. Id. 
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contractual relationships with the same company,248 especially for large 
corporations like Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Halliburton.249  When such 
contracts come up for renewal (presumably debarment would not terminate 
all other existing contracts), the government has the inconvenience and 
bears the costs of finding a suitable replacement.250  In some cases, this is 
virtually impossible due to the scale of some federal projects and the 
enormous set-up costs for providers.251 
The DOJ echoed these concerns in its response to several questions about 
its stance on drafting legislation compelling mandatory debarment for 
FCPA violations:  “If every criminal FCPA resolution were to carry with it 
mandatory debarment consequences, then prosecutors would lose the 
necessary flexibility to tailor an appropriate resolution given the facts and 
circumstances of each individual case.”252  The real reason for the DOJ’s 
rejection of the mandatory debarment proposal appears to be evident in the 
preceding sentence of its response—that sanctioning those perceived as 
being too big to debar despite egregious FCPA violations “would likely 
lead to the cessation of revenues for a government contractor—a virtual 
death knell for the contractor–company.”253 
2.  Prosecutors’ Influence over Debarment Decisions 
An agency’s decision to suspend or debar a contractor from future 
business with the United States is a direct result of whatever charges federal 
prosecutors brought against the firm.  For example, BAE’s 
misrepresentation of $5 million in bribes and kickbacks paid to a Saudi 
official fell squarely within the language of the FCPA’s accounting 
provision.254  A more general statute criminalizes the submission of false 
statements to the United States.255  Yet because BAE was prosecuted under 
the latter statute (which does not trigger an agency’s discretionary 
debarment authority) rather than the former (which triggers an agency’s 
 
 248. See generally John S. Pachter, The New Era of Corporate Governance and Ethics:  
The Extreme Sport of Government Contracting, 13 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 247 (2004) 
(arguing against the use of debarment as a sanction). 
 249. See generally Jennifer S. Zucker, The Boeing Suspension:  Has Increased 
Consolidation Tied the United States Department of Defence’s Hands?, 13 PUB. 
PROCUREMENT L. REV. 260 (2004). 
 250. See CATHERINE DONNELLY, DELEGATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWER TO PRIVATE 
PARTIES 79–81, 94 (2007).  For discussion of the “switching costs” problem in other areas of 
government contracting, see Dru Stevenson, Privatization of State Administrative Services, 
68 LA. L. REV. 1285, 1291, 1303 (2008); Dru Stevenson, Privatization of Welfare Services:  
Delegation by Commercial Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 83, 115 (2003). 
 251. See Danielle Brian, Contractor Debarment and Suspension:  A Broken System, 13 
PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 235, 236–38 (2004); Zucker, supra note 249, at 273–76. 
 252. Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:  Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of the U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 
(2010) [hereinafter Examining Enforcement] (questions for the record by Sen. Christopher 
Coons). 
 253. Id. 
 254. See Koehler, supra note 97, at 994–95. 
 255. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006). 
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discretionary debarment authority), BAE was insulated from suspension or 
debarment from its contracts with the United States. 
The DOJ denies ever using specific language in settlements that would 
prevent debarments and suspensions.  Breuer insisted at the Senate 
hearings, “I don’t think we ever do, Senator.”256  As one commentator 
pointed out, however, this position is inconsistent given that the DOJ 
sentencing memoranda in its Siemens prosecution explicitly stated that it 
selected sanctions that would avoid “collateral consequences” that would 
result from criminal FCPA anti-bribery charges.257  This included the “risk 
of debarment and exclusion from government contracts.”258  BAE is 
another major United States government contractor; DOJ pleadings against 
it aver that in “2008, BAE was the largest defense contractor in Europe and 
the fifth largest in [America] as measured by sales.”259
The DOJ faced a series of follow-up questions after a November 2010 
hearing on FCPA enforcement held by the Senate Judiciary Committee.  
When asked whether “a mandatory, conduct-based, debarment remedy for 
companies that engage in egregious bribery [would] further the deterrent 
effect of the FCPA,” the DOJ conceded the possibility, but stated that the 
deterrent effect of mandatory debarment “would likely be outweighed by 
the accompanying decrease in incentives for companies to make voluntary 




F.  H.R. 5366:  Overseas Contractor Reform Act 
 
The infamous phrase “too big to fail” became part of our national lexicon 
following the collapse of the U.S. economy in 2008.261
Cognizant of this emerging concern among its constituents, on 
September 15, 2010, the House of Representatives passed the Overseas 
  Initially, 
government officials used this phrase to describe the dire economic 
consequences that would follow the failure of one of the nation’s bedrock 
banks.  Following the government’s “bailout” of banks that were seen as 
being too big to fail, however, enraged voters increasingly used the phrase 
to criticize the conflict of interest that resulted from the government’s 
overreliance on a handful of private sector entities.  Thus, the phrase 
highlights the dangers of placing too many matters of public concern in the 
hands of too few companies. 
 
 256. Protecting American Taxpayers, supra note 56 (statement of Asst. Att’y Gen. Lanny 
A. Breuer).  
 257. Koehler, supra note 97, at 996. 
 258. Id. (citing Sentencing Memorandum at 11, United States v. Siemens 
Aktiengesellschaft, No. 1:08-cr-00367 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008)). 
 259. Id. at 996 (citing Complaint at ¶ 1, United States v. BAE Sys., No. 1:10-cr-00035 
(D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2010)). 
 260. Examining Enforcement, supra note 252. 
 261. See generally ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL:  THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW 
WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM CRISIS—
AND THEMSELVES (2009). 
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Contractor Reform Act262 (OCRA).  The initial success of the OCRA, 
which would have required that federal agencies consider debarring 
government contractors that violate the FCPA, was likely due to the 
escalating concern that government contractors that engage in egregious 
acts of foreign corruption might similarly be viewed as “too big to debar.”  
In 2011, Senator Franken expressed this concern to Assistant Attorney 
General Breuer, as quoted above:  “I think part of the problem is that we’re 
too dependent on a handful of very large contractors, particularly when it 
comes to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that too many contractors 
maybe now are too big to fail.”263
Senator Franken’s follow-up question to Breuer called attention to the 
fundamental weakness of the OCRA’s proposed language, when he asked, 
“How frequently is DOJ putting in settlements—specific language that can 
be used to prevent debarments and suspensions?”
  The bill never came to a vote in the 
Senate. 
264  Mr. Breuer assured 
the Senator that the DOJ never considers the possibility of debarment when 
deciding whether to prosecute a large government contractor’s foreign 
bribery and subsequent cover-up under the FCPA (thereby triggering 
discretionary debarment) or a similar law (e.g., false statements under 18 
U.S.C. §1001) that avoids triggering discretionary debarment.265
The DOJ and SEC have admitted to considering the “collateral 
consequences” of prosecuting foreign corruption under the FPCA on a 
number of occasions, and in fact, have official instructions to do so.
 
266  In 
prosecuting BAE for falsely recording bribe payments, the DOJ used non-
FCPA charges to avoid exposing one of the United States’ key defense 
suppliers to the EU’s mandatory debarment provisions triggered by the 
FCPA.267  Prosecutors similarly structured settlement language to avoid 
debarment in the Siemens268 and Daimler269
 
 262. H.R. 5366, 111th Cong. (2010).  The proposed language would require that “any 
person found to be in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 shall be 
proposed for debarment from any contract or grant awarded by the Federal Government 
within 30 days after a final judgment of such violation” unless waived by the agency. Id. 
 cases.  Finally, when directly 
 263. Protecting American Taxpayers, supra note 56 (statement of Sen. Franken). 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. (statement of Asst. Att’y Gen. Lanny A. Breuer). 
 266. See Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, supra note 239, 
§ 9-28.300.  In determining whether and what to charge a corporation with, in connection to 
foreign corruption, the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations instructs 
prosecutors to consider the “collateral consequences, including whether there is 
disproportionate harm to shareholders, pension holders, employees, and others not proven 
personally culpable, as well as impact on the public arising from the prosecution” in bringing 
charges. Id. § 9-28.300-A.7. 
 267. BAE Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 191.  BAE’s sentencing memorandum 
explained, “BAES’s business is primarily from government contracts, including with several 
EU customers.” Id. at 15.  
 268. Sentencing Memorandum at 11, United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, No. 
1:08-cr-00367 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008) (“The Department’s analysis of collateral 
consequences included the consideration of the risk of debarment and exclusion from 
government contracts.”). 
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questioned about its stance on imposing mandatory debarment on 
contractors that engage in particularly egregious acts of corruption, the DOJ 
asserted that “a mandatory conduct-based debarment remedy for companies 
could well have a negative impact on the Government’s ability to 
investigate and prosecute transnational corruption effectively.”270
These examples illustrate the fatal flaw of the OCRA’s requirement that 
agency heads consider suspending or debarring contractors that violate the 
FCPA—that is, the prosecutors still have the ability to avoid triggering such 
proceedings simply by refusing to prosecute foreign corruption under the 
FCPA.  Prosecutors are not solely to blame, though.  Even in cases outside 
the ambit of the FCPA, FAR provides agencies with the discretion to 
suspend or debar contractors that engage in bribery wholly apart from 
prosecutions conducted by the SEC and DOJ.
 
271  As Mr. Breuer pointed out 
to Senator Franken, federal prosecutors “don’t have the expertise of the 
department or agency who has to decide how valuable [a] particular 
contractor is,”272
As a result, the responsibility to deter foreign corruption through 
suspension and debarment largely falls on each federal agency that transacts 
business with private contractors.  The leaders within these agencies should 
regularly consult with the DOJ, Congress, and other policy makers to 
determine whether avoiding the collateral consequences that may result 
from debarring contractors viewed as “too big to debar” justifies the mixed 
messages and toxic side effects that result from the United States’ 
complacency in preventing the spread of corruption. 
 nor do they have statutory authority to do so. 
G.  The “Collateral Consequences” of Debarment 
All too often, corruption functions as a buffer against policy-based 
regulations.273
 
 269. Sentencing Memorandum at 12, United States v. Daimler AG, No. 1:10-cr-00063 
(D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2010) (noting that the DOJ’s “analysis of collateral consequences included 
the consideration of the risk of debarment and exclusion from government contracts, and in 
particular included European Union Directive 2004/18/EC, which provides that companies 
convicted of corruption offenses shall be mandatorily excluded from government contracts 
in all EU countries.”). 
  Federal prosecutors play an important role as “vehicle[s] 
effecting widespread structural reform within corrupt corporate cultures,” 
and therefore must balance a number of competing interests when deciding 
 270. Examining Enforcement, supra note 252. 
 271. Under FAR 9.406-2, an agency may, at its discretion, debar a contractor for 
“[c]ommission of . . . bribery, falsification or destruction of records, making false 
statements, . . . [or c]ommission of any other offense indicating a lack of business integrity 
or business honesty that seriously and directly affects the present responsibility of a 
Government contractor or subcontractor.” FAR 9.406-2(a)(3), (5) (2010) (emphasis added).  
 272. Protecting American Taxpayers, supra note 56 (statement of Asst. Att’y Gen. 
Breuer). 
 273. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 30, at 472 (describing the view that laws do not 
sufficiently deter multinationals from “vigorously pursu[ing] corruptly influenced contracts,” 
as well as the opposite view, which asserts that “moral signals from the countries that have 
prohibited corruption by statute” sufficiently deter foreign corruption). 
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how best to punish and deter foreign corruption.274
With so many moving parts, prosecutors have the unenviable task of 
considering the seemingly infinite number of scenarios that might unfold 
following charges of corruption.  Thus, “[t]he FCPA ultimately proves to be 
a large-scale study in the law of unintended consequences.”
  In exercising their 
discretion over such matters, prosecutors must consider the broad-ranging 
implications that economic sanctions may have on companies with 
thousands of employees working in dozens of countries. 
275  The global 
scale of most FCPA prosecutions makes balancing the United States’ desire 
“to aggressively root out corporate fraud” with its competing interest of 
“remaining sensitive to the considerable collateral consequences of moving 
criminally against an entire entity” a difficult task indeed.276  The risk of 
negative “collateral consequences” is particularly high when an FCPA 
prosecution may lead to a company’s suspension or debarment from 
government contracts.  As a result, in determining whether to prosecute a 
company under the FCPA, the DOJ and SEC “consider collateral 
consequences” of suspension and debarment when determining whether to 
charge companies under the FCPA or under alternative statutes that do not 
trigger discretionary suspension and debarment.277
Potential collateral consequences that may result from a government 
contract’s suspension or debarment include:  (1) an oligopoly on 
government contracts by the remaining few contractors with enough 
capacity to satisfy government orders, (2) injured diplomatic relations with 
foreign allies, (3) the threat to national security that may occur if the United 
States severs ties with key suppliers in the areas of national defense and 
energy, (4) the risk that United States businesses may miss out on lucrative 
economic opportunities in emerging markets due to the overdeterrent effect 
of suspension and debarment, (5) the risk of “disproportionate harm to 




 274. Thomas, supra note 
 and (6) the 
political risk associated with pursuing agency allies in the private sector. 
16, at 454. 
 275. Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions:  Understanding Anti-bribery 
Legislation as Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV. 351, 358 
(2010). 
 276. Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’:  Current Trends in 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 166 (2008). 
 277. Christopher M. Matthews, Mendelsohn and Scarboro Spread the FCPA Gospel, 
MAIN JUSTICE (Mar. 23, 2010, 1:27 PM), http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/03/23/
mendelsohn-and-scarboro-spread-the-fcpa-gospel/ (reporting that Mendelsohn admitted that 
the DOJ does consider the collateral consequences of suspension and debarment when 
structuring settlement agreements “[i]n response to a question about the DOJ’s recent 
settlement with BAE Systems”). 
 278. DEPT’ OF JUSTICE, RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES TO SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS 
CONCERNING PHASE 3, OECD WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY 16 (May 21, 2010) [hereinafter 
RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES, SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS] (citing Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations, supra note 239, § 9-28.300). 
2011] TOO BIG TO DEBAR? 815 
Federal prosecutors have used these considerations in at least three cases 
to justify relatively generous plea agreements279 that avoided exposing the 
prosecuted companies to potential suspension or debarment from United 
States contracts, and avoided exposing the United States to the collateral 
risks associated with such penalties.  In response to OECD questions about 
the U.S. government’s self-interest in shirking debarment sanctions, U.S. 
officials cited the DOJ’s handling of the matters involving BAE 
Systems,280 Siemens,281 and Daimler282 as examples of when “the harm 
[that] potential debarment would ca[u]se to the public, both in the U.S. and 
abroad . . . was taken into consideration in prosecution and sentencing.”283
1.  Concern for Diplomatic Consequences 
 
Federal agencies are aware that the decision to suspend or debar a 
multinational company that services foreign allies may lead “to the 
complete wreckage of a vital strategic relationship” for the United States.284
The U.K. government’s decision to snuff out prosecutors’ inquiry into 
the corrupt dealings of key Middle Eastern allies highlights the tension 
between the government’s desire to uphold its pledge to root out foreign 
corruption and its desire to preserve vital strategic alliances “in critical and 
  
For instance, had federal agencies debarred BAE from continuing to 
transact business with the United States, BAE would not have received the 
billions of dollars in subsequent U.S. contracts, which in turn would have 
resulted in massive layoffs in BAE’s offices across the globe, including the 
U.K., India, and Canada. 
 
 279. That is, plea agreements that did not implicate potential suspension and debarment 
despite strong evidence of egregious acts of foreign corruption that likely otherwise justify 
such severe penalties. 
 280. BAE Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 191 (“European Union Directive 
2004/18/EC, which has recently been enacted in all EU countries through implementing 
legislation, provides that companies convicted of corruption offenses shall be mandatorily 
excluded from government contracts.”). 
 281. See Sentencing Memorandum at 11, United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, 
No. 1:08-cr-00367 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008). 
 282. Sentencing Memorandum at 12, United States v. Daimler AG, No. 1:10-cr-00063 
(D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2010).  The Memorandum states: 
In accordance with the Department’s Principles of Federal Prosecution of 
Business Organizations, the Department considered a number of factors in its 
decisions regarding the overall disposition.  Those factors included, but were not 
limited to, Daimler’s cooperation and remediation effort, as well as any collateral 
consequences, including whether there would be disproportionate harm to the 
shareholders, pension holders, employees, and other persons not proven personally 
culpable, and the impact on the public, arising from the prosecution.  The 
Department’s analysis of collateral consequences included the consideration of the 
risk of debarment and exclusion from government contracts, and in particular 
included European Union Directive 2004/18/EC, which provides that companies 
convicted of corruption offenses shall be mandatorily excluded from government 
contracts in all EU countries. 
Id. 
 283. RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES, SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS, supra note 278, at 
16–17. 
 284. Transcript, supra note 178. 
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volatile areas of the world.”285  This may explain why “[t]he DOJ enforced 
the [FCPA] with great trepidation” during the first two decades of its 
existence, “fearing that the Act’s enforcement would damage relations with 
allies” because debarring companies that pay kickbacks to “allied 
government officials would be far from diplomatic.”286
2.  Concern for Creating a Monopoly 
 
In addition to the problem of existing interdependent relationships, where 
the government actually needs that vendor,287 there is the problem of 
reduced competition for future bidding on new projects.288  One in four 
federal requests for proposal (RFPs) currently receive only one bid, and are 
essentially non-competitive, so there are no competitive savings for the 
government.  This percentage is likely to increase substantially if major 
federal contractors face debarment.  The result is higher costs for the 
government and the taxpayers on future projects.289
Yet this picture is incomplete, and the cost increases are hard to 
quantify.
 
290  The sanction under consideration is for bribing foreign 
government officials in order to obtain lucrative contracts.  The purpose of 
these bribes is to secure a contract for an inflated price—to win against 
lower-cost bidders—or to induce the foreign government to procure goods 
and services that it otherwise would not.291  Inflated costs and superfluous 
procurements drain the public resources in the countries where the FCPA 
violations occur; if the local government is financing the projects through 
American foreign aid, the corruption misappropriates American government 
resources indirectly.  When the same firm is obtaining myriad contracts 
domestically, there can be no confidence that it won these contracts fairly 
and competitively, at the lowest cost to the American taxpayers.292
 
 285. Spalding, supra note 
  Even 
where a firm had no prior history of bribery, its success with the foreign 
bribe (which became the predicate for FCPA charges) can give the 
275, at 398. 
 286. Thomas, supra note 16, at 448–49. 
 287. See, e.g., Zucker, supra note 249, at 264–70 (discussing the Boeing suspension). 
 288. See Brian, supra note 251, at 236–38. 
 289. For more on the problem of monopoly power of certain government contractors, see 
John Donahue, The Transformation of Government Work:  Causes, Consequences, and 
Distortions, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT 41, 58–61 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 
2009); Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power:  Privatizing Military Efforts and the Risks to 
Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT 110, 118.  
A similar market failure can also occur when the market is highly localized. See ELLIOT D. 
SCLAR, YOU DON’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR:  THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATIZATION 
83–90 (2000). 
 290. See generally Charles E. Hyde & Jeffrey M. Perloff, Can Monopsony Power Be 
Estimated?, 76 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1151 (1994) (discussing monopsony effects on prices 
and problems with speculating about the effects, outside the context of debarment). 
 291. See Brian, supra note 251, at 235–38. 
 292. See Susan M. Collins, What the MCI Case Teaches About the Current State of 
Suspension and Debarment, 13 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 218, 220–22 (2004). 
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corporation a taste for the convenience of ill-gotten gains.293  We should 
not underestimate the corrupting influence of the bribe on the firm that 
makes it.294
Moreover, when large firms elude debarment due to the federal 
government’s dependence on them, it contributes to the consolidation of the 
market (oligopoly trends),
 
295 which further undermines competitive bidding 
and potential cost savings from federal outsourcing.296  In other words, 
existing monopsony problems297 are the biggest obstacle to using 
debarment, but preventing monopsony problems is an argument in favor of 
using debarment.298  Monopsony is a dysfunctional market situation where 
there is a single buyer of goods or services.299
 
 293. See Brian, supra note 
  The “too big to debar” 
problem is actually an outgrowth of the inherent monopsony problems with 
251, at 236–37 (“While there is nothing wrong per se with 
having such a programme [for waiving debarment if a contractor creates an internal ethics 
compliance program], there is no empirical evidence that the mere existence of these 
programmes truly alter the culture of the company.  All of the most serious recidivist 
companies in the POGO [Project on Government Oversight] database have been members of 
the Defense Industry Initiative, and have had internal ethics programmes in operation for 
years.”). 
 294. See id. 
 295. See id. at 237. 
 296. See James J. McCullough & Abram J. Pafford, Government Contract Suspension 
and Debarment:  What Every Contractor Needs to Know, 13 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 
240, 243–45 (2004) (explaining that some firms ask the government to debar their 
competitors so that they can win the bids on future contracts, eliminating the competition). 
 297. See Edward Rubin, The Possibilities and Limitations of Privatization, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 890, 920 (2010) (reviewing GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT (Jody Freeman & Martha 
Minow eds., 2009)) (discussing the monopsony problem inherent in the outsourcing of 
public benefits to private entities). 
 298. Monopsony describes situations where there is only one purchaser or funder for 
particular services. See id.; see also Dru Stevenson, A Million Little Takings, 14 U. PA. J. L. 
& SOCIAL CHANGE 1, 47–49 (2011) (discussing monopsony in the Interest on Lawyers’ Trust 
Accounts (IOLTA) context); Dru Stevenson, Rethinking IOLTA, 76 MO. L. REV. 455, 481–
84 (2011) (same).  Economists argue that monopsony tends to lower the availability of the 
purchased service or good to below-optimal levels. See R. Baldwin et al., Regulating Legal 
Services:  Time for the Big Bang?, 67 MOD. L. REV. 787, 792 (2004) (discussing the 
monopsony problem with legal services in Great Britain); see also generally Robert L. Bish 
& Patrick D. O’Donoghue, Public Goods, Increasing Cost, and Monopsony:  Reply, 81 J. 
POL. ECON. 231 (1973) [hereinafter Bish & O’Donoghue, Public Goods]; Robert L. Bish & 
Patrick D. O’Donoghue, A Neglected Issue in Public-Goods Theory:  The Monopsony 
Problem, 78 J. POL. ECON. 1367 (1970); Michael Cooke & Daniel Lang, The Effects of 
Monopsony in Higher Education, 57 HIGHER EDUC. 623 (2009); Josse Delfgaauw & Robert 
Dur, From Public Monopsony to Competitive Market:  More Efficiency but Higher Prices, 
61 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 586 (2009); Marvin B. Johnson, The Effect of Monopsony Power 
on Teachers’ Salaries, 10 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 56 (1978); Hirofumi Shibata, Public 
Goods, Increasing Cost, and Monopsony:  Comment, 81 J. POL. ECON. 223 (1973). 
 299. See Rubin, supra note 297, at 920–21. 
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government outsourcing.300  In this sense, however, debarment serves an 
incapacitation purpose more than it provides deterrence.301
The monopsony features inherent in government contracting allow 
service providers to manipulate the officials into funding unnecessary 
services and to stick with familiar entities rather than newcomers.
 
302  
Edward Rubin observes that ultimately “government monopsony breeds 
contractor monopoly,”303 and the monopsony and monopoly effects 
“reinforce each other.”304  The state agencies contracting with private firms 
are “subject to concerted efforts from each potential contractor interested in 
persuading it to adopt a program design that only that contractor can 
fulfill.”305
3.  Concern for Economic Consequences of Overdeterrence 
 
One of the central tenets of law and economics holds that punishing 
borderline corporate misconduct with severe penalties may unintentionally 
lead to overdeterrence.  In other words, “salutary . . . conduct might be 
shunned by businessmen who chose to be excessively cautious in the face 
of uncertainty regarding possible exposure to criminal punishment for even 
a good-faith error of judgment.”306
No doubt the legitimate threat of suspension and debarment would 
significantly decrease American companies’ willingness to engage in 
corrupt practices to bolster their bottom line.  That said, such a sword of 
Damocles
 
307 might deter U.S. companies from pursuing otherwise 
profitable business opportunities in emerging markets because of the 
company’s increased exposure to corrupt foreign officials.308  As prosperity 
shifts to emerging markets overseas, those companies may forego profitable 
ventures to avoid the unlikely, but highly troubling risk of FCPA 
debarment.309
 
 300. See Brian, supra note 
 
251, at 235 (“[Until 2004], it appeared that large federal 
contractors had been immune to being suspended or debarred from obtaining additional 
government contracts . . . [because] not one major contractor had been suspended or 
debarred in a decade—despite all the misconduct that populates [the Project on Government 
Oversight] database.”). 
 301. See generally Marcia G. Madsen, The Government’s Debarment Process:  Out-of-
Step with Current Ethical Standards, 13 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 252 (2004) (arguing in 
favor of more consistent use of debarment, an end to waivers for large corporations, and an 
incapacitation-designed approach to the sanction). 
 302. Id. at 921. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. 
 306. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 (1978). 
 307. See Schooner, supra note 12, at 214. 
 308. See Spalding, supra note 275, at 355–56; see also Bixby, supra note 47, at 104. 
 309. Lacey, supra note 134, at 440 (“The long-term effect of increasing corporate 
regulation during the past three decades and the worldwide interest in preventing business 
corruption should reduce the number of executives willing to risk the penalties and the 
public censure.”). 
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In addition to its chilling effect on commerce, penalizing FCPA 
violations with suspension and debarment may result in two other negative 
unintended side effects.  First, such severe penalties may “breed[] 
overcompliance by risk-averse companies mindful of the consequences of a 
DOJ [FCPA] inquiry—even if that inquiry is not based on viable legal 
theories.”310  By threatening to cut off a contractor’s primary revenue 
stream (i.e., government contracts) if one of its employees gets caught 
tendering bribes in a foreign country, suspension and debarment shift a 
company’s incentive away from making desirable capital outlays 
(streamlining its supply chain, R&D, increasing its capacity, etc.) to 
investing in extensive compliance measures.311
On the other hand, perhaps the threat of suspension and debarment 
provide the necessary incentive for companies that might not otherwise 
implement adequate ethics and compliance programs.  Similarly, although 
the deterrent potency of the increased use of suspension and debarment may 
lead to an overinvestment in unnecessary corporate compliance, tendering 
briefcases full of cash to low-level officials, showering foreign royalty with 
lavish gifts, and stashing millions of dollars into secret corporate slush 
funds can hardly be viewed as sound investments. 
 
The use of suspension and debarment as an FCPA sanction may also 
raise concerns that the increased possibility of such a severe penalty may 
have a chilling effect on a company’s voluntary disclosure of bribery.312
“Even when the Government impose[s] neither suspension nor 
debarment, the threat of a corporate death penalty provides incentive for 
firms to enter into less draconian compliance agreements, and then comply 
with the terms of those agreements.”
  
Although legitimate, the chilling effect is easy to avoid for the same reasons 
that self-reporting has actually increased in recent years alongside the size 
of fines imposed under the FCPA.  Prosecutors have successfully 
incentivized self-disclosure with promises of lenient sentencing in the form 
of lesser fines. 
313  As a result, the perception that 
suspension and debarment are more severe than potential fines may actually 
result in a greater number of voluntary disclosures.314
 
 310. Examining Enforcement, supra note 
 
34, at 8 (statement of Professor Mike Koehler). 
 311. On the other hand, perhaps the threat of suspension and debarment provides the 
necessary incentive for companies that might not otherwise implement adequate ethics and 
compliance programs.  Similarly, although the deterrent potency of the increased use of 
suspension and debarment may lead to an overinvestment in unnecessary corporate 
compliance, tendering briefcases full of cash to low-level officials, showering foreign 
royalty with lavish gifts, and stashing millions of dollars into secret corporate slush funds 
can hardly be viewed as sound investments. 
 312. See Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 140, at 154. 
 313. Schooner, supra note 12, at 214. 
 314. See Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 140, at 154–55. 
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CONCLUSION 
The FCPA is an important statute for combating corruption globally, and 
for maintaining the integrity of federal outsourcing relationships at home.  
It has taken on increasing significance in recent years as FCPA enforcement 
has grown and penalties have spiraled upward.  The sanctions are still too 
thin, however.  The restricted set of sanctions the government has been 
using against violators is hampering the effectiveness of the FCPA in 
achieving Congress’s purpose of deterring bribery and fraud in government 
contracting. 
Despite the magnitude of recent fines and penalties for FCPA violators, 
these sanctions represent a tiny fraction of the potential revenue available 
from lucrative government contracts.  Discounted by the low probability of 
detection, the fines and penalties are far too low to deter unlawful activity, 
especially when firms obtain even larger contracts with the federal 
government following the sanctions.  There is also an inherent unfairness, 
or at least imprudence, in awarding enormous government contracts to 
firms that the government has just prosecuted for fraudulently obtaining 
foreign contracts.  Worse, the largest firms with the most government 
contracts have the least incentive to comply with the law. 
Debarment would be a far more potent deterrent, if the government was 
serious about reducing corruption, and would fit more logically into the 
policy goal of protecting public funds from misappropriation.  Debarment 
would deter potential wrongdoers and incapacitate previous offenders.  It is 
unfortunate, therefore, that the enforcement agencies consistently refuse to 
seek suspension or debarment of firms that flout the FCPA.  Of course, it 
would not be painless for the government to lose certain established 
contractors, but given that debarments typically last only two years, this is 
more of a temporary inconvenience for the government.  For the firms 
caught bribing foreign officials, however, a two-year hiatus from all 
government contracts presents remarkable opportunity costs.  The deterrent 
would induce more firms to comply with the law, allowing the “too big to 
debar” problem to diminish over time.  This would foster greater 
confidence in the federal government at home and abroad, and would help 
fledgling governments in developing countries mature into effective 
political systems. 
 
